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Do the Fiduciary Duties of Pension Funds Hinder
Socially Responsible Investment?
Benjamin J. Richardson*
In recent years, pension funds and other institutional investors have begun to give more
attention to the environmental and social behaviour of the companies in which they
invest. A recent movement for socially responsible investment (SRI) seeks to exclude
companies that pollute or ignore human rights, for example, and to champion those that
behave ethically and responsibly. However, some confusion among investment decision-
makers persists about the extent to which their fiduciary duties to beneficiaries allow
policies that may sacrifice financial returns for environmental or other philanthropic
causes. This is compounded by the belief that they cannot secure the best returns in
respect of their fiduciary obligations with current socially responsible companies. With
reference to the main common law jurisdictions, this article critically examines whether
the fiduciary duties of pension fund investors hinder SRI. Contrary to some commonly
held beliefs, SRI can often sit comfortably with fiduciary duties to invest prudently.
However, legal reforms to improve the climate for SRI would help, as evident by some
recent initiatives in several jurisdictions.
Depuis quelques anne´es, les caisses de retraite et les autres investisseurs institutionnels
sont plus sensibles au comportement environnemental et social des socie´te´s dans
lesquelles ils investissent. Un mouvement re´cent en faveur de l’investissement
socialement responsable (l’ISR) vise a` exclure par exemple, des socie´te´s qui polluent
ou celles qui ne´gligent les droits de l’homme et a` privile´gier plutoˆt celles qui adoptent
un comportement e´thique et responsable. Toutefois, il persiste une certaine confusion
parmi les de´cideurs en matie`re de placement qui se demandent dans quelle mesure leurs
obligations fiduciaires leur permettent d’adopter des politiques qui sacrifieraient des
rendements financiers pour des causes environnementales ou d’autres causes
philanthropiques. Cette confusion est aggrave´e par la crainte de ne pouvoir obtenir les
meilleurs rendements, conforme´ment a` leurs obligations fiduciaires, dans le cadre de
placements dans les socie´te´s socialement responsables actuelles. En rapport avec les
principales juridictions de common law, l’auteur analyse cette question de savoir si les
obligations fiduciaires des investisseurs de caisses de retraite constituent une entrave a`
l’ISR. Contrairement a` certaines opinions ge´ne´ralement re´pandues, il est d’avis que
l’ISR cadre souvent bien avec les obligations fiduciaires d’investir de manie`re prudente.
* Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. I wish to acknowledge the
assistance of Linda Chiasson (Osgoode law student) in the research and editing of
this article.
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En revanche, des re´formes juridiques visant l’ame´lioration de l’ambiance de l’ISR
seraient utiles, comme le prouvent certaines initiatives re´centes ayant e´te´ mises en œuvre
dans plusieurs juridictions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Do the fiduciary obligations of pension funds currently hinder
socially responsible investment (SRI)? Trustees of pension funds
charged with the investment of funds on behalf of others are legally
obliged to act prudently and loyally in the best interests of their bene-
ficiaries. Some investors and lawyers believe that these obligations re-
strict pension funds from taking non-financial criteria into account.1
This is because, absent a specific mandate to invest ethically, they be-
lieve an investment intermediary must choose investments that maxi-
mize financial returns for beneficiaries. A fiduciary who breaches pru-
dent investment standards is liable to compensate beneficiaries for losses
attributable to this breach of duty.2
No authoritative or societal agreement exists on what constitutes
“socially responsible investment”. For the purposes of my analysis, I
treat SRI generally as an investment process that considers the social,
environmental and ethical consequences of investments, both positive
and negative. In recent years, a stronger demand for SRI has emerged
in Western financial markets. It has been attributed to various factors,
including investor awareness of the positive correlation between cor-
porate environmental and financial performance. There are also external
pressures from non-governmental groups fuelling public opinion
through the media, demanding that companies and their financiers act
more responsibly.3
Socially responsible investment may be achieved through several
methods. Primarily, ethical investors use positive and/or negative
screens.4 A negative screen excludes companies involved in questiona-
ble activities (e.g., nuclear power or pesticides manufacture) while a
1 J.D. Hutchinson & C.G. Cole, “Legal Standards Governing Investment of Pension
Assets for Social and Political Goals” (1980) 128(4) U. Pa. L. Rev. 1340; P. Ali &
K. Yano, Eco-Finance (The Hague: Kluwer, 2004) 128-40; J.H. Langbein & R.A.
Posner, “Social Investing and the Law of Trusts” (1980) 79 Mich. L. Rev. 72.
2 L. Ho, “Attributing Losses to a Breach of Fiduciary Duty” (1998) 12 Trust L. Int’l
66.
3 See P.C. Hunt (ed.), Values to Value: A Global Dialogue on Sustainable Finance
(Geneva: United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative, 2004); E.G.
Geltman & A.E. Skroback, “Environmental Activism and the Ethical Investor”(1997)
22(3) J. Corp. L. 465; J.J. Bouma, M.H.A. Jeucken & L. Klinkers (eds.), Sustainable
Banking: The Greening of Finance (Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing, 2001).
4 R. Sparkes, The Ethical Investor (London: HarperCollins, 1995).
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positive screen selects firms engaged in desirable practices (e.g., renew-
able energy supply). “Best of sector” is another popular SRI method, by
which those companies that perform best in their industry sector are
selected for investment, as measured against specified socially respon-
sible indicators. An “index-based” method of SRI by contrast constructs
investment portfolios through established indices of environmentally
and socially responsible companies, such as the Dow Jones Sustainabil-
ity Group Index.5 Some financiers address social and environmental
issues only when they are percieved as financially material to their client
portfolios. This is a less direct form of SRI investing, followed when it
promises a financial benefit (either through investment performance or
growing market demand) or avoids a financial risk to investors (either
large environmental fines or negative publicity). Finally, investors may
use corporate engagement and shareholder activism, in combination
with the above methods or as a separate strategy, to influence corporate
policies.6
The SRI sector is a small segment of capital markets. For example,
in Western Europe, this sector holds about three to four percent of both
wholesale and retail investment markets.7 The United States, boasting
the largest SRI sector, held US$2.29 trillion in SRI assets (2005) or
“nearly one out of every ten dollars under professional management...”.8
A 2004 survey of Canadian SRI found the sector to be worth C$51.4
billion, amounting to 3.3 percent of the total investment market.9 By
comparison, the Australian SRI sector held just 1.14 percent (2005) of
all assets under management.10 All such studies must be cautiously
compared due to different definitions and methodologies in each country
measuring SRI.
5 See online: www.sustainability-indexes.com.
6 E.g., A.K. Prevost & R.P. Rao, “Of What Value are Shareholder Proposals Sponsored
by Public Pension Funds?” (2000) 73(2) Journal of Business 177.
7 Avanzi SRI Research, Green, Social and Ethical Funds in Europe 2004 (Milan: SIRI
Group, 2004); European Social Investment Forum (EUROSIF), Socially Responsible
Investment among European Institutional Investors (Paris: EUROSIF, 2003).
8 Social Investment Forum (SIF), 2005 Report on Socially Responsible Investing
Trends in the United States: A 10-Year Review (SIF, January 2006) iv.
9 Social Investment Organization (SIO), Canadian Social Investment Review 2004
(Toronto: SIO, 2005).
10 Corporate Monitor, Sustainable Responsible Investment in Australia – 2005 (Syd-
ney: Ethical Investment Association, 2005) 12.
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Various economic, institutional and legal factors hinder the expan-
sion of the SRI market beyond its relatively small niche. This article
posits that fiduciary obligations of investment managers number among
some of the legal barriers to SRI as a mainstream investment practice.
A recent study on capital markets undertaken for Canada’s National
Round Table on the Environment and the Economy concluded: “current
interpretations of the fiduciary duties of pension fund managers may
unnecessarily constrain their ability to address the full range of relevant
corporate responsibility considerations related to prospective invest-
ments”.11 Conversely, a United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) report (2005) concluded that investment managers’ fiduciary
duties should not necessarily preclude or overly hamper SRI.12
From the assumption that we should encourage SRI to promote a
more sustainable economy, this article provides a doctrinal exegesis of
fiduciary investment duties while evaluating whether they hinder SRI.
The analytical focus is the fiduciary duties of pension funds in selected
common law jurisdictions, namely Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the
United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). It does not consider
investment standards governing other types of institutional investment
managers (e.g., insurance companies or mutual funds). Nor does it ex-
amine legal developments in other, non-common law jurisdictions.13
Contrary to common perceptions on the subject, SRI does not always or
necessarily conflict with fiduciary duties of pension funds. Moreover,
fulfilling fiduciary obligations can actually require careful attention to
corporate social and environmental performance. The article concludes
by evaluating reforms to fiduciary duties and ancillary standards in
concert with promoting the growth of SRI.
11 Stratos Inc., Corporate Disclosure and Capital Markets (Ottawa: National Round
Table on the Environment and the Economy, 2004) 12.
12 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, A Legal Framework for the Integration of Environ-
mental, Social and Governance Issues into Institutional Investment (Geneva: UNEP
Finance Initiatives October 2005).
13 Some analysis of investors’ responsibilities in these jurisdictions is given in the
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer study, ibid.
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2. FIDUCIARY INVESTMENT STANDARDS
(a) The Fiduciary Relationship
Shorn of context-specific labels, a fiduciary relationship is gener-
ally a relationship of responsibility and dependency.14 Fiduciary rela-
tionships arise “when one party (the ‘fiduciary’) acts on behalf of another
party (the ‘beneficiary’) while exercising discretion with respect to crit-
ical resources belonging to the beneficiary”.15 In this relationship, ben-
eficiaries – or dependant parties – rely upon the fiduciary to manage
some aspect of their personal or economic affairs over which the fidu-
ciary has control and responsibility.
Two features of this fiduciary relationship are notable. First, con-
siderable discretionary power is vested in the fiduciary. This discretion
is exercised within broad parameters of care and loyalty that bind the
fiduciary’s authority. Second, typically the beneficiary has been pre-
cluded from exercising any control over that area. These principal ele-
ments of the fiduciary relationship inform specific legal duties.
Consequential to the powers afforded them, fiduciaries must act in
the dependant’s interests, and not their own. As such, the fiduciary’s
foremost duty is one of loyalty to the beneficiary – to act in their sole or
best interests.16 As pension trustees are fiduciaries, this principle is
behind the prohibitions on engaging in conflict-of-interest transactions
adverse to the interests of pension plan members.17 In the management
of an investment portfolio, the fiduciary must also exercise due care,
diligence, and skill. These standards coalesce to form the twin key duties
of loyalty and prudence, the latter known as the “prudent person rule”
or “prudent investor rule”.18
14 See generally R. Flannigan, “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability” (2004)
N.Z.L. Rev. 215; J.C. Shepherd, “Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Rela-
tionships” (1981) 97 Law Q. Rev. 51.
15 D.G. Smith, “The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty” (2002) 55 Vand. L.
Rev. 1399 at 1483.
16 Hutchinson & Cole, supra, n. 1 at 1367; J. Langbein, “Questioning The Trust Law
Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?” (2005) 114 Yale L.J. 929.
17 A. Hudson, The Law on Investment Entities (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2000) at
85-86.
18 See generally B. Longstreth, Modern Investment Management and the Prudent Man
Rule (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
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Fiduciary responsibilities can arise in various ways. In common
law jurisdictions, they occur in relationships that are presumptively
fiduciary such as trustee-beneficiary. The “trust” is a concept of English
law by which specific assets are constituted and managed by trustees for
the benefit of the beneficiary.19 The entity (e.g., an individual or a
corporation) that creates the trust is called the settlor.
The equitable notion of a fiduciary relationship arose because tra-
ditionally the beneficiary had no right recognized in common law. The
English courts of equity began to acknowledge the beneficiary’s interest
and imposed a responsibility upon the fiduciary to protect that interest.20
Trusts are widely used as a means of corporate financing, in both pension
plans and mutual funds.21 Sometimes the factual circumstances of a
relationship also engender fiduciary obligations, such as a relationship
between investment advisor and client.22
Basic Structure of a Trust Arrangement
19 See D.J. Hayton, “The Irreducible Core Content of Trusteeship” in A.J. Oakley (ed.),
Trends in Contemporary Trust Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1996), 47; A. Hudson,
Principles of Equity and Trusts (London: Cavendish, 1999); Hudson, supra, n. 17
at 66-74; D. Hayton, “English Fiduciary Standards and Trust Law” (1999) 32 Vand.
J. Transnat’l L. 555; D. DeMott, “Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation” (1988) Duke L.J. 879.
20 In countries without a trust concept, contract law for example may be used to impose
prudent investor standards.
21 P. O’Hagan, “The Use of Trusts in Finance Structures” (2000) 8(2) Journal of
International Trust and Corporate Planning.
22 According to Clarke, the only difference between these two situations is the onus of
proof: “In traditional relationships a fiduciary relationship is assumed and the onus
is on the defendant to demonstrate otherwise. In fact-based fiduciary relationships,
which includes the relationships between [investment advisors] and their clients, the
onus is on the plaintiff client to establish that a fiduciary relationship existed”. G.A.
Clarke, Liability and Damages in Unsuitable Investment Advice Cases (Toronto:
Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP, 2005).
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The prudent investor rule, as shown later in this article, is particu-
larly significant for SRI. The rule evolved through case law, supple-
mented by statutory provisions that generally altered it to accommodate
the more contemporary practices of institutional investment and the
dynamics of modern capital markets.23 Such regulation sometimes im-
poses quantitative restrictions on the type and size of investment assets
in a portfolio.24
The prudent investor rule addresses the behaviour of fiduciaries
rather than results of investment decisions. The prudent investor rule
presumes that any investment is permissible without any prohibition, if
selected with care and prudence. Thus, fiduciaries are not judged by
historical financial performance, but by the reasonableness of their de-
cision-making process.
In particular, trustees or fiduciaries are expected to have adequate
skill with investing and to exercise due care in fulfilling their tasks (the
duty of competence). Often this results in the need for fiduciaries to seek
expert advice and to delegate various activities to those with requisite
skill.25 Another standard commonly connected to the prudent investor
rule is the principle of diversification. A fiduciary should avoid specu-
lative and unduly risky investments,26 and a diverse portfolio can mini-
mize investment risk.
(b) Evolution of Fiduciary Investor Standards
Fiduciary investor standards have evolved over time and now vary
slightly in each jurisdiction. There may even be varying standards in
different economic sectors within a single jurisdiction (e.g., between
pension plans and charitable trusts).
23 J.H. Langbein, “The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Com-
merce” (1997) 107 Yale L.J. 165.
24 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Survey of In-
vestment Regulations of Pension Funds (Paris: OECD, 2001); E.P. Davis, Portfolio
Regulation of Life Insurance Companies and Pension Funds, Discussion Paper PI-
0101 (London: The Pensions Institute, City University, 2001).
25 Hayton, supra, n. 19 at 562-63.
26 But see M.T. Johnson, “Speculating on the Efficacy of ‘Speculation’: An Analysis
of the Prudent Person’s Slipperiest Term of Art in Light of Modern Portfolio Theory”
(1996) 48 Stan. L. Rev. 419.
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The conception of trusts in the 18th century was a means of pro-
tecting family wealth over succeeding generations.27 The prudent inves-
tor rule emphasized risk aversion and preserving capital rather than asset
growth and prohibiting delegation of investment decisions. In 1720, the
South Sea Company collapsed, in which trust assets were invested and
suffered great financial loss. As a result, British authorities legislated to
restrict trustees to a limited list of allowable investments.28 Fiduciary
obligation, it appears, was measured in the preservation of the benefi-
ciaries’ capital. In time, the list lengthened due to market forces, but the
notion that certain types of asset classes (e.g., equities) might be inher-
ently imprudent persisted for centuries afterwards. This approach was
followed in other common law jurisdictions, each enforcing prohibited
lists of their own.
Historically, fiduciaries were expected to evaluate risks and returns
of each individual investment rather than evaluating the overall perfor-
mance of a portfolio.29 In the US case of King v. Talbot,30 the prudent
investor rule was interpreted conservatively as prohibiting “speculative”
investing per se, emphasizing a duty to preserve the trust’s capital. The
suitability of investments had to be assessed strictly on a case-by-case
basis.31 As stated, it would thus be impermissible to offset that specific
risk with another investment in the context of the entire portfolio.
Some commentators have extrapolated that the traditional formu-
lation of the prudent investor standard effectively precluded any socially
responsible investments that posed unusual risk, as each would need to
be assessed and justified on their own terms.32
The traditional prudent investor prescriptions run contrary to max-
imizing performance of modern investment funds, where the cyclicality
27 On the roots of trusts, see Hudson, supra, n. 17.
28 On this episode, see J. Carswell, The South Sea Bubble (London: Cresset Press,
1960).
29 See generally A.W. Scott & W.F. Fletcher, The Law of Trusts (Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1988).
30 40 N.Y. 76 (1869). See also the US case of Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass.
454 (1830) and the British case of Whiteley, Re (1886), 33 Ch. D. 347 (Eng. C.A.).
31 US law on the prudent investor rule changed little until the 1980s: see J.N. Gordon,
“The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule” (1987) 62 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 52.
32 Ali & Yano, supra, n. 1 at 131.
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of investments mandate diversification to spread risk. Consequently,
modern portfolio theory (MPT) has redefined the prudent investor rule.33
The MPT evaluates investments not in isolation, but rather by their
contribution on the performance objectives and risk profile of the entire
portfolio.34 By emphasizing the portfolio as a whole rather than the
individual components (the whole is greater than the sum of its parts),
diversification is at the heart of MPT. The theory suggests that a portfolio
can offer a higher rate of return with lower overall risk than suggested
by the mere sum of its parts, where investments are combined that do
not correlate or correlate negatively (i.e., their market prices do not
move in tandem) to each other. Thus, while an individual ethical in-
vestment in a new environmental technology business might seem in
isolation too risky, in combination with other investments it may con-
stitute a prudent investment for a fiduciary.35
The MPT has shaped a reformulation of the prudent investor rule
in several jurisdictions through statutory reform and judicial activism.
The traditional onus to seek the highest return on each individual in-
vestment has deferred to a duty to adopt an investment strategy that
incorporates sound risk and return objectives over the entire trust port-
folio. Concomitantly, legislation has freed trustees from the restrictions
of the laundry list of permissible investments. In the UK, the High Court
in Nestle v. National Westminster Bank held:
Modern trustees acting within their investment powers are entitled to be judged
by the standards of current portfolio theory, which emphasizes the risk level of
the entire portfolio rather than the risk attaching to each investment taken in
isolation.36
Both the UK’s Pensions Act 1995 and the Trustee Act 2000 reflect
such investment standards.37
33 P.G. Haskell, “The Prudent Person Rule For Trustee Investment and Modern Port-
folio Theory” (1990) 69 N.C.L. Rev. 87.
34 F.J. Fabozi, F. Gupta & H.M. Markowitz, “The Legacy of Modern Portfolio Theory”
(2002) 11(3) Journal of Investing 7.
35 However, in theory the negation of risk arises because another investment (in the
diverse portfolio) offsets the environmentally focused company’s risks – where its
objectives by nature may run contrary to the purposes of the new environmental
technology – and thereby perhaps defeating the SRI purpose.
36 (1996), 10 T.L.I. 111 at 115 (per Hoffman J.).
37 Pensions Act 1995, s. 36(2)(a) and (b), and Trustee Act 2000, s. 4(1), 3(a)-(b).
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A similar transformation of investment duties has emerged in the
US. The prudent investor rule appears in federal statutes (notably, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 1974), state statutes
implementing uniform laws or through state common law often with
reference to the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Third Restatement of
Trusts (Prudent Investor Rule). The ALI’s enunciation of the prudent
investor rule requires fiduciaries to:
• assess investments not in isolation but by reference to their con-
tribution to the whole investment portfolio;
• rather than merely seek to “maximize” the return of individual
assets, to implement a holistic investment strategy that is rational
and appropriate to the fund;
• create a diverse investment portfolio; and
• judge the prudence of an investment at the time the investment
was selected rather than by hindsight.38
For US non-government pension plans,39 the ERISA takes a whole
portfolio approach to asset management.40 The US Department of Labor
specifically clarified that the statutory standard means that the “prudence
of a particular investment decision should not be judged without regard
to the role that the proposed investment or investment course of action
plays within the overall portfolio”.41
An equivalent legal position exists in Canada.42 The model Uniform
Trustee Investment Act 1997, which has shaped trustee legislation in
nearly all of the common law provinces, provides for the replacement
of the traditional formulation of the prudent investor rule with an MPT-
based standard. When investing trust funds, the Act requires a fiduciary
38 American Law Institute (ALI), Restatement (Third) of the Law Trusts: Prudent
Investor Rule (Washington DC: ALI, 1990) 8 (section 227). See further, E.C. Hal-
bach, “Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement” (1992) Iowa L. Rev. 1151;
R.J. Aalberts & P.S. Poon, “The New Prudent Investor Rule and the Modern Portfolio
Theory: A New Direction for Fiduciaries” (1996) 34 Am. Bus. L.J. 39.
39 Although ERISA does not apply to government pension plans such as the Employees’
Retirement System, some states have legislated the prudent investor rule as their
fiduciary standard for their state pension fund trustees.
40 ERISA, s. 404 sets forth the general standards of fiduciary conduct.
41 29 US Code of Federal Regulations, s. 2550.404a-1(b).
42 See D.W.M. Waters, Law of Trusts in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2005).
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to have regard to the circumstances of the trust, including “the role that
each investment or course of action plays within the overall trust port-
folio”.43 Canadian courts have unequivocally affirmed that pension funds
are subject to trust law precepts, as clarified by statute.44 Prudential
investment standards from trust law are articulated in Canadian provin-
cial and federal legislation, albeit not entirely consistently.45 Further, the
Federal Investment Rules of 1993 modernized the regulation of pension
fund investment by abandoning the previous legal list approach that
rigidly specified permissible classes of investments.46
New Zealand’s Trustee Act 1956 was amended in 1988 to introduce,
to some extent, more modern investment principles.47 Private pension
plans are governed by the Superannuation Schemes Act 1989. New
Zealand has relatively few occupational pension funds because the tax-
ation benefits that have enabled such funds to flourish in other jurisdic-
tions are non-existent.48 Its Superannuation Schemes Act stipulates that
pension plan assets must be invested in accordance with the Trustee Act
1956.49 Recent case law there confirms that courts are taking a different
43 Uniform Trustee Investment Act 1997, s. 01(3)(c). The Act was prepared by the
Uniform Law Conference of Canada for adoption by Canadian governments.
44 See, e.g., Bathgate v. National Hockey League Pension Society (1994), 16 O.R. (3d)
761, 1994 CarswellOnt 643, 1 C.C.P.B. 209, 69 O.A.C. 269, 2 C.C.E.L. (2d) 94,
110 D.L.R. (4th) 609, 2 E.T.R. (2d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at 776 [O.R.]; leave to appeal
refused (1994), 4 E.T.R. (2d) 36, 4 C.C.P.B. 272 (note) (S.C.C.); Boe v. Alexander
(1987) 41 D.L.R. (4th) 520, 1987 CarswellBC 182, 15 B.C.L.R. (2d) 106, 41 D.L.R.
(4th) 520, 28 E.T.R. 228 (B.C. C.A.) at 526–27 [D.L.R.]; leave to appeal refused
(1988), 43 D.L.R. (4th) vii, 87 N.R. 299 (note), 22 B.C.L.R. (2d) xxx, 28 E.T.R.
xxxvi (S.C.C.). See further T.G. Youdan, Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Scarbor-
ough: Carswell, 1989).
45 See especially G. Yaron, “The Responsible Pension Trustee: Re-Interpreting the
Principles of Prudence and Loyalty in the Context of Socially Responsible Institu-
tional Investing” (2001) 20 E.T.P. J. 305.
46 These regulations were made under the Pension Benefits Standards Act 1985.
47 Incorporated into ss. 13B and 13E; for analysis, see A. Butler, “Modern Portfolio
Theory and Investment Powers of Trustees: The New Zealand Experience” (1995)
7 Bond Law Review 119.
48 L. Marriott & C. Fowler, From Social Policy to Economic Policy:TaxationIncentives
for Retirement Income Savings in New Zealand (1910-2005), Working Paper No.
18 (Wellington: School of Accounting and Commercial Law, Victoria University of
Wellington, 2005) 22.
49 Section 8(a).
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view of prudent investment standards.50 In Mulligan, Re,51 the New
Zealand High Court held that the trustee’s duty to act with due diligence
and prudence was flexible and should reflect changing economic con-
ditions and contemporary investment philosophies.
During the 1990s, all Australian jurisdictions followed New Zea-
land and abolished the old legal list of authorized trustee investments,
giving trustees plenary investment power.52 The trustee statutes contain
significant allusions to the precepts of MPT that inform the US Third
Restatement of Trusts (Prudent Investor Rule) 1992, including: the de-
sirability of diversifying trust investments, and the potential for capital
appreciation.53
However, both Australian and New Zealand trustee legislation ar-
guably contain provisions redolent of earlier concepts of prudential
investment. Ali and Yano, who have studied these jurisdictions closely,
are critical of the statutes’ retention of an arguably artificial distinction
between prudent and speculative investments, as well as duties to pre-
serve the capital and income of the trust, and to take account of the risk
of capital or income.54 Recent case law tends to confirm that Australian
courts still view trusts as governed by traditional norms of investment
management.55
For occupational pension plans, Australia’s Superannuation Indus-
try (Supervision) Act 1993 contains no such ambiguities and allows
trustees of pension funds to invest according to modern investment
practices. The Act provides that trustees of pension funds must:
. . . formulate and give effect to an investment strategy that has regard to the
whole of the circumstances of the [fund] including, but not limited to, the follow-
ing:
50 See E.P. Manns, Jr., “New Zealand Trustee Investing: Reflecting on Modern Port-
folio Theory and the Ancient Distinction of Principal and Income” (1998) 28(4)
V.U.W.L.R. 611.
51 [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. 481 (New Zealand H.C.).
52 E.g., New South Wales (Trustee Amendment (Discretionary Investments) Act 1997;
Queensland (Trustee (Investments) Amendment Act 1999; Victoria (Trustee and
Trustee Companies (Amendment) Act 1995).
53 E.g., Trustee Act 1925 (NSW), s. 14C(1); Trusts Act 1973 (Qld), s. 24(1).
54 Ali & Yano, supra, n. 1 at 135-37.
55 E.g., Doneley v. Doneley, [1998] Qd. R. 602; Wright v. Wright, [2002] WASC 30.
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(ii) the composition of the [fund’s] investments as a whole including the
extent to which the investments are diverse or involve the [fund] in
being exposed to risks from inadequate diversification.56
This statutory requirement for pension fund trustees to take a
whole-of-portfolio approach towards investment selection (MPT) has
effectively recast the prudent investor rule.
Fiduciaries also owe beneficiaries a duty of loyalty. It is a long-
standing and most fundamental duty, whose underlying purpose is to
advance the best interests of the beneficiaries. Traditionally, it has been
interpreted as requiring fiduciaries to act exclusively for the beneficiaries
as opposed to acting for their own or third-party interests. In the US, the
duty of “undivided loyalty”57 has been defined as requiring a trustee “to
administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary”.58 In Cana-
dian law, the duty has been expressed as “to act honestly, in good faith
and in the best interests of the members...”.59 The “interests of the
beneficiaries” to whom the trustee must be loyal are the beneficial
interests as provided in the terms of the trust. Courts and legislatures
have developed prophylactic rules to ensure fiduciaries act loyally, such
as requirements to avoid conflict of interests, not to delegate responsi-
bilities (the “personal performance rule”) and to act impartially towards
the beneficiaries (the “even hand” rule).60 In recent years the law appears
to have evolved in some jurisdictions to allow fiduciaries to consider
collateral interests of beneficiaries, such as their status as employees, or
third parties to be considered, but they must be subordinate to benefi-
ciaries’ interests.
The duty of loyalty has been interpreted as requiring the trustees
to demonstrate that the decision is motivated only by the financial in-
terests of the beneficiary. This particularly applies where the purpose of
the trust is to provide financial benefits to beneficiaries, such as a pension
plan providing future retirement income. Thus, even if a trustee very
carefully undertook an investment strategy, meeting the prudent investor
56 Section 52(2)(f)(ii).
57 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 62 A.L.R. 1, 249 N.Y. 458 (U.S. N.Y. Ct. App.,
1928).
58 American Law Institute, supra, n. 38, s. 5.
59 Pension Benefits Standards Act (BC), s. 8(5)(b).
60 A.B. Laby, “Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships” (2004) 54 Am.
U.L. Rev. 75, 99-108.
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standard, this would not necessarily discharge the duty of loyalty if it
were of no benefit to beneficiaries. However, a “benefit” is not neces-
sarily confined to a financial benefit. If beneficiaries share a moral
objection to a particular form of investment, it could be construed as for
their benefit if the trust avoided that investment, possibly even at the
cost of a lower financial return.61 A charitable trust is an example where
beneficiaries’ interests might be defined in moral rather than strictly
financial terms.
In all jurisdictions, fiduciaries may be liable for investments that
breach duties of loyalty and prudence. “Imprudence” can range from
grossly negligent investment choices, to simple failure to exercise the
care and skill of a prudent person.62 Criminal sanctions can apply for
more serious and flagrant breaches of fiduciary duty. If an investment
was improperly divested by some breach of that duty, the trustee could
be liable for damages. It is calculated based on the loss of value of the
stock or asset, plus the value of the income that would have accrued if
the investment had been retained (offset by the investments and earnings
of the replacement assets).
Conversely, where the breach is the fiduciary’s failure to select
appropriate investments, perhaps due to improper ethical screening, it
is possible to demonstrate that had an investment been made, the trust’s
investment portfolio would have earned more. Financial returns can be
tracked historically, so it is very easy to show that if a different invest-
ment was selected, the fund would have performed differently. However,
it would be harder to show that the investments were imprudent, as the
fiduciary would have had to have the requisite knowledge to anticipate
some potential future negative impact on performance – this would be
difficult, as one is effectively evaluating the fiduciary on her ability to
foretell the future.63 The problem of acknowledging and measuring dam-
ages for a breach of an SRI-policy that produced only moral harm to
beneficiaries, without financial loss, is noted in the next section.
61 P. Palmer, et al., Socially Responsible Investment: A Guide for Pension Schemes
and Charities (London: Haven Publications, 2005) 97.
62 Hudson, supra, n. 17 at 93-96.
63 On the problems of proving loss and causation generally, see G. Watt & M. Stauch,
“Is there Liability for Imprudent Trustee Investment?” (1998) 62 Conveyancer 352.
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In conclusion, the fiduciary investor rules have been demonstrated
to be broadly applicable, flexible and resilient. This flexibility enables
accommodation of the wide variety of objectives and circumstances of
different investment plan fiduciaries and to adapt over time to changes
in the operation of financial markets. Whether this extends to accom-
modating SRI is examined next.
3. IMPLICATIONS OF FIDUCIARY INVESTOR
STANDARDS FOR SRI
(a) Accommodating Non-Financial Benefits
While some commentators observe that the duties of prudential
investment and loyalty constrain the scope for SRI,64 their contemporary
formulation in North America and other jurisdictions may accommodate
various SRI policies. Before looking specifically at the pensions sector,
some general conclusions can be drawn from the preceding discussion
about the implications of fiduciary standards for trustees wishing to
invest ethically. The following arguments suggest that it is far from the
case that fiduciary responsibilities forbid or implicitly hinder SRI.
Rather, both the fiduciary responsibilities of investors and the definition
and methods of SRI are sufficiently flexible to allow SRI in some
situations. Fiduciary responsibilities may not generally allow financial
returns to be sacrificed, but there remains plenty of scope for SRI within
the fiduciary framework.
The first major observation is that fiduciaries have an overarching
responsibility to promote the best interests of their beneficiaries, and in
the context of modern financial markets this has usually meant to opti-
mize financial returns. Because financial returns is an easy yardstick to
measure, optimization of financial returns is perhaps a construct of the
courts as much as financial markets. Some courts or legislatures have
framed the duty as one of not merely acting in their “best” interests but
in their “sole interests”.65 A sole interest test makes it irrelevant to
consider whether the investments provide collateral benefits to others
(e.g., a local community or the natural environment). However, the law
64 Hutchinson & Cole, supra, n. 1, Langbein & Posner, supra, n. 1; Ali & Yano, supra,
n. 1 at 128-39.
65 E.g., Australia’s Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993, s. 62.
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is evolving to sometimes favour a “best interest” test, which may there-
fore accommodate collateral benefits so long as no conflict of interest
arises. In a pension plan context, the European Union’s Occupational
Pensions Directive provides in its investment rules that “the assets shall
be invested in the best interests of the members and beneficiaries”.66 The
US Department of Labor, which administers the ERISA, has advised
that the statute’s fiduciary standards “do not preclude consideration of
collateral benefits, such as those offered by a ‘socially-responsible’
fund...”.67
Whether acting loyally in the best or sole interests of beneficiaries
allows fiduciaries to accommodate third party benefits, depends also on
how we define the “interests” of beneficiaries. If a trust is established
for financial benefits, the interests of beneficiaries will normally be
financial. But “benefit” need not be cast purely in financial terms. If the
trust is established to further some ethical, social, or charitable goal
connected with broader society, then fiduciaries should act in accordance
with those benefits.
A second related observation in the case of a trust established to
provide financial benefits, is that courts should not find a fiduciary acting
imprudently if she considers non-financial objectives without sacrificing
financial returns.68 However, non-financial goals would have to remain
a subordinate investment objective. Given evidence that SRI funds
match or even exceed the financial returns of non-SRI funds in the same
class,69 socially and environmentally responsible companies arguably
66 Directive 2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 June 2003
on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirementprovision,
O.J. L. 235/10, Article 18. Also, the UK’s Occupational Pension Schemes (Invest-
ment) Regulations 2005 characterize the trustee’s chief duty to beneficiaries as acting
in their “best interests”, except “in the case of a potential conflict of interest, [where
they must act] in the sole interest of members and beneficiaries”: clause 4(2).
67 Cited in B. Goodman, The Environmental Fiduciary: The Case for Incorporating
Environmental Factors into Investment Management Policies (Oakland: The Rose
Foundation, 2004) 33; among case law on a “best interest” approach, see Withers v.
Teachers’ Retirement System, 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y., 1978); affirmed mem.
595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir., 1979); Board of Trustees v. Baltimore (Mayor), 317 Md.
72, 562 A.2d 720 (1989); Donovan v. Bierwith, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir., 1982).
68 E.g., Bishop of Oxford v. Church Commissioners for England, [1992] 1 W.L.R. 1241
(U.K.).
69 See, e.g., M.V. Russo & P.A. Fouts, “A Resource-Based Perspective on Corporate
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constitute a prudent investment choice, when clearly evaluated against
financial criteria alone.70 Often, social and environmental risks are ma-
terial to financial returns, and companies with positive environmental
performance also enjoy sound financial performance.71
But while improved corporate environmental performance may
correlate positively with financial performance, sometimes the relation-
ship does not correlate.72 Where governmental or social sanctions against
environmental harm are absent or feeble, economic development at the
expense of the environment can boost corporate profits. In such circum-
stances, financial markets reward companies that exploit these weak-
nesses rather than those firms that refrain from doing so. Because busi-
nesses can benefit from exploiting systemic weaknesses where
governmental or social sanctions are lacking, capital markets perversely
amplify the incentives for companies to take full advantage. Conversely,
companies that refrain from exploitation suffer competitive disadvan-
tages.
Yet, a third key consideration is that fiduciary investors who utterly
ignore environmental and social considerations arguably may also con-
Environmental Performance and Profitability” (1997) 40(3) Academy of Manage-
ment Journal 534; C.A. Mallin, B. Saadouni & R.J. Briston, “The Financial Perfor-
mance of Ethical Investment Funds” (June 1995) Journal of Business Finance and
Accounting 22; S. Foerster & P. Asmundson, “Socially Responsible Investing: Better
for Your Soul or Your Bottom Line?” (2001) 14(4) Canadian Investment Review
26.
70 See S. Labatt & R.R. White, Environmental Finance: A Guide to Environmental
Risk Assessment and Financial Products (New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 2002)
at 151-55.
71 E.g., L. Mahoney & R. Roberts, “Corporate Social and Environmental Performance
and Their Relation to Financial Performance and Institutional Ownership: Empirical
Evidence on Canadian Firms” (Toronto: on file at Jantzi Research, 2002); S.A.
Waddock & S.M. Graves, “The Corporate Social Performance Financial Perfor-
mance Link” (1997) 18(4) Strategic Management Journal 303; D. Edwards, The Link
Between Environmental and Financial Performance (London: Earthscan, 1998).
Financial markets can punish polluters by reducing prices for their company shares:
D. Cormier, M. Magnan & B. Morard, “The Impact of Corporate Pollution on Market
Valuation: Some Empirical Evidence” (1993) 8(2) Ecological Economics 135; P.
Lanoie, P. Laplante & M. Roy, “Can Capital Markets Create Incentives for Pollution
Control?” (1998) 26 Ecological Economics 31.
72 See further C. Mackenzie, “The Scope for Investor Action on Corporate Social and
Environmental Impacts”, in R. Sullivan & C. MacKenzie (eds.), Responsible In-
vestment (Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing 2005) 20.
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travene their fiduciary obligations. Some ecological and human rights
issues are becoming so pervasive and serious that few investors can
continue to be indifferent to their impact. Climate change is an example.
Recently, some investment advisors and consultants suggest that pension
trustees have a fiduciary duty to specifically consider the financial risks
of climate change.73
Institutional investors are waking up to the threat of global warm-
ing.74 In 2000, the Carbon Disclosure Project was established to provide
an international secretariat for the world’s major institutional investors
to collaborate on the business implications of climate change.75 In 2003,
an Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR) was formed to promote
better understanding of the financial risks and investment opportunities
posed by climate change.76 The INCR presently includes some 50 insti-
tutional investors collectively managing US$3 trillion in assets. Over
400 institutional investors attended the INCR’s Summit on Climate Risk
held in May 2005 at the UN headquarters in New York.77 They see
climate change as a defining factor for industries that produce significant
carbon dioxide emissions, such as in the energy, automobile and forestry
sectors. In the UK, the Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change
provides a forum for collaboration at a national level among pension
funds and other institutional investors on climate change risks and in-
vestment opportunities.78
The breadth of institutional investors’ assets across the economy
also reinforces the fiduciary-like responsibilities to respect the wider
social and environmental ramifications of their investments.79 It would
73
“Climate Change a ‘Fiduciary Duty’ for Trustees – Mercer” Environmental Finance
(Sept. 2005); Mercer Investment Consulting, A Climate for Change – A Trustee’s
Guide to Understanding and Addressing Climate Risk (Toronto: Mercer Investment
Consulting, 2005).
74 See A. Dlugolecki, Climate Change and the Financial Services Industry (Geneva:
UNEP Finance Initiatives Climate Change Working Group, 2002).
75 Online: Carbon Disclosure Project www.cdproject.net.
76 Online: Investor Network on Climate Risk www.incr.com.
77 A.A. Dossal & M.S. Lubber, “Climate Change: Investment Summit Assesses Risks
and Opportunities”, online: UN Chronicle Online www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/
2005/issue2/0205p75.html.
78 Online: Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change www.iigcc.org.
79 See J.P. Hawley & A.T. Williams, The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism: How Institu-
tional Investors Can Make Corporate America More Democratic (Philadelphia:
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seem a zero-sum game for an investor to favour a profitable but polluting
fossil fuel business if it created risks and costs for other economic sectors
the investor has a stake in.
However, these arguments that some acute ecological or social
problems engender a special responsibility on fiduciaries do so precisely
because of the presence or perceived future likelihood of government
regulation, consumer pressure or other social sanctions that would po-
tentially impact the financial performance of their investments. In other
words, the responsibilities of fiduciary investors tend to follow rather
than lead broader societal responses to social and environmental prob-
lems, in so far as it affects performance.80 Thus, if climate change were
merely an obscure concern of a handful of prescient scientists – which
is clearly not the case – arguments that investors have a fiduciary re-
sponsibility to take climate change threats into account would seem
implausible if there is no effect on financial performance.
Another pragmatic problem with the above arguments is how the
courts would measure damages when a fiduciary fails to invest ethically
when required to do so by its investment mandate (e.g., a charitable
trust). Would this be even more difficult if this omission did not cause
financial damage to the beneficiaries? In light of the financial gain,
could the latter bring a claim of a breach of fiduciary duty against the
trustees for failing to implement an SRI policy? Perez suggests that one
possible legal response, as developed by the Israeli Supreme Court,
would be the creation of a new tortious remedy. It would focus not on
the question of financial damage, “but on the grievance to the individ-
ual’s integrity or autonomy, manifested in the deliberate disregard of
his moral beliefs and preferences”.81
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000); R.A.G. Monks, The New Global Investors:
How Shareowners Can Unlock Sustainable Prosperity Worldwide (Oxford: Cap-
stone, 2001).
80 Financiers only tend to “lead” when there is a clear financial benefit.
81 O. Perez, “The New Universe of Green Finance: From Self-Regulation to Multi-
Polar Governance” in O. Dilling, M. Herberg & G. Winter (eds.), Responsible
Business: Self-Governance in Transnational Economic (Oxford: Hart Publishing)
[forthcoming in 2007], citing Daaka v. Carmel Hospital - Haifa, Supreme Court
Case 2781/93 and Tnuva v. Ravi Tufic, Supreme Court Case 1338/97.
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(b) Fiduciary Obligations in the Context of SRI Policies
Specific methods and practices of SRI may also influence how
social and environmental considerations interact with broad parameters
of fiduciary duties owed to beneficiaries.
To maximize returns or at least to match the performance of the
market as a whole, fund managers usually construct diversified invest-
ment portfolios based on the precepts of MPT.82 But, while contemporary
investment standards of diversification no longer require narrow eval-
uation of investments on a case-by-case basis, they may still hinder some
forms of SRI. For example, environmental and social investment screens
that constrict investment portfolios by excluding specific companies or
economic sectors hamper true diversification.83 Also, diverse portfolios
can lead to smaller holdings in any particular investment, thereby re-
ducing trustees’ influence in individual companies. This potentially di-
minishes the scope for the shareholder activist methods of SRI.84
Many commentators however stress that fiduciaries have a duty to
monitor their investments and actively protect those investments through
proxy voting, engaging in dialogue, and other strategies.85 While com-
mentators dispute some of the assumptions of MPT86 – for example,
because markets operate under imperfect information and institutional
investors are too large to have a neutral impact on financial markets –
MPT retains its prestige among financial regulators and fund managers.87
82 See further W.F. Sharpe, Portfolio Theory and Capital Markets (New York: Mc-
Graw-Hill, 1970) at 20-24; R.A. Brealey & S.C. Myers, Principles of Corporate
Finance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988) at 136-39.
83 See P. Luxton, “Ethical Investment by Charities: A Slippery Slope?” (1992) 142
New L.J. 16; R. Ellison, “The Golden Fleece? Ethical Investment and Fiduciary
Law” (1991) 5(4) Trust L. Int’l 157.
84 See J.E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of
Company Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) at 168-69.
85 Goodman, supra, n. 67 at 32; E. Tasch & S. Viederman, “New Concepts of Fiduciary
Responsibility” in F. Capra & G. Pauli (eds.), Steering Business Toward Sustaina-
bility (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1995) 125; R.H. Koppes & M.L.
Reilly, “An Ounce of Prevention: Meeting the Fiduciary Duty to Monitor an Index
Fund through Relationship Investing” (1995) 20 J. Corp. L. 413.
86 On the inefficiency of capital markets, see W.F.M. De Bondt & R.H. Thaler, “Further
Evidence on Investor Overreaction and Stock Market Sensationality” (1987) 42(3)
Journal of Finance 557; B.N. Lehmann, “Fads, Martingales and Market Efficiency”
(1990) 105(1) Quarterly Journal of Economics 1.
87 See W. Lee, “Modern Portfolio Theory and the Investment of Pension Funds” in P.
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Finally, in some situations the duty to diversify can actually favour
environmentally sound investment choices; for example, in the energy
sector, this should entail moving beyond just fossil fuel industry invest-
ments to include renewable energy companies supplying wind and solar
power.
A second aspect of SRI policies is that where fiduciaries seek to
take social, ethical and environmental considerations into account to
provide non-financial benefits, they should consult with the beneficiar-
ies. A common argument against SRI policies based on members’ pref-
erences is that beneficiaries may hold conflicting views on ethical ques-
tions. While disagreements will most likely permeate traditional ethical
or religious issues, such as alcohol or gambling, substantial agreement
in other areas may readily arise. For instance, members of a pension
fund probably rarely favour deliberate environmental degradation or
human rights’ violations. In the pension sector, the development of SRI
options rather than a single investment policy across a common fund
can help to accommodate diverse preferences among members.88
Where fiduciaries factor ethical preferences into their investment
policy, they should ensure that these are their beneficiaries and not their
own.89 Thus, fiduciaries should ascertain the views of beneficiaries, and
keep them informed about implementation of an SRI policy. The ad-
vancement of social or ethical values is a non-financial benefit. A further
pragmatic reason to consult with beneficiaries is that they probably
cannot, if properly informed, hold the trustee liable for a breach of trust
if the beneficiaries consented to it.90 Consent is directly responsive to
the policy that informs the loyalty rule, which is to maximize the best
interests of the beneficiary.
A third aspect of the methods of SRI is that while inflexible negative
screens may collide with fiduciary duties because of their exclusion of
certain sectors, this is not so with other SRI strategies. Best of sector
methods allow for retention of a diverse portfolio in accordance with
Finn (ed.), Equity and Commercial Relationships (Sydney: Law Book Company,
1987) 303; M.E. Porter, “Capital Disadvantage: America’s Capital Investment Sys-
tem” (1992) 70(5) Harvard Business Review 65.
88 Palmer, et al., supra, n. 61 at 110.
89 See Clore’s Settlement Trusts, Re, [1966] 2 All E.R. 272 (U.K.) at 275.
90 See, e.g., US Uniform Trust Code, s. 802(b)(4), 7C U.L.A. 229 (Supp.).
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MPT. Further, corporate engagement, where investors seek to influence
company management rather than passively invest, should contribute to
the fulfilment of fiduciary responsibilities. Indeed, investment managers
who do not act when faced with evidence of poor corporate governance
may breach fiduciary standards.91 The UK’s Myners Report on institu-
tional investment considered that where shareholder activism was in the
best financial interests of the beneficiaries, it was “arguably already a
legal duty of both pension fund trustees and their fund managers to
pursue such strategies”.92
Further, SRI policies typically garner additional research that in
turn can provide a better understanding of individual companies. This
may ultimately contribute to better stock selection. Conversely, the ad-
ditional administrative costs involved in implementing SRI methods can
create additional fund management expenses, which can in turn diminish
returns to fund beneficiaries.93 So, the costs of SRI strategies including
corporate engagement must be balanced against the potential increased
returns from added vigilance.
A second more fundamental objection to active monitoring and
engagement management is that it conflicts with the “efficient market”
theory.94 This theory’s core premise is that capital markets are efficient
because “the prices of goods sold in that market fully reflect all available
information about those goods”.95 It therefore posits that one cannot
“beat the market” because in order to do so the investor would need
information about businesses that is not yet generally known. But some-
times there is a delay between a company’s financially relevant envi-
ronmental record and the reaction of the “efficient market” to that in-
formation.96 Thus, fiduciaries who entrust the market to efficiently
91 R.H. Koppes & M.L. Reilly, “An Ounce of Prevention: Meeting the Fiduciary Duty
to Monitor an Index Fund Through Relationship Investing” (1995) 20 Iowa J. Corp.
L. 414.
92 P. Myners, Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review (London: HM
Treasury, 2001), chapter 5, at 115, para. 5.
93 P.U. Ali & M. Gold, “Investing for Good: The Cost of Ethical Investment” (2002)
20(5) Company and Securities Law Journal 307.
94 The theory was pioneered in E. Fama, “Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work” (1970) 25(2) Journal of Finance 383.
95 J.R. Macey, “An Introduction to Modern Financial Theory” 36 (1991) Begleiter 37.
96 For general criticisms of the theory, see B.G. Malkiel, “The Efficient Market Hy-
pothesis and Its Critics” (2002) 17(1) Journal of Economic Perspectives 59; R. Ball,
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capture environmental behaviour may fail to act in their beneficiaries’
best interests. Some empirical research shows that investors who engage
in corporate governance (e.g., filing shareholder resolutions and asking
questions to company management) outperform their peers on measures
such as return on investments.97
A final seminal observation about implications of fiduciary duties
for SRI is that the applicable trust instrument governs a trustee’s duties
and investment decisions foremost.98 This is another aspect of the duty
of loyalty. Thus, if that trust deed expressly requires the trustee to invest
according to specific (e.g., ethical) criteria, then it must heed those
criteria.99 For instance, charitable trusts and mission-based institutions
are typically organized under a trust mandate that expressly directs how
the eleemosynary institution will invest for philanthropic purposes. The
UK Charity Commission, which supervises British charities under the
Charities Act 1993, has issued guidance stressing that charities can make
investments that do not seek the best financial returns, if they advance
the organization’s charitable goals.100
For a new investment scheme, the trust deed may be drawn up on
any terms, subject to statutory and commercial restrictions. For example,
taxation legislation may only provide tax concessions to trusts estab-
lished for the sole purpose of providing financial benefits to members.101
Therefore, it may be more difficult to amend an existing trust, as this
power must normally be exercised only for a granted purpose. Amend-
“The Theory of Stock Market Efficiency: Accomplishments and Limitations”
(Spring, 1995) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 4.
97 See, e.g., G. Morgenson, “Shares of Corporate Nice Guys Can Finish First” (27
April 2003) New York Times, section 3 at 1.
98 See McCreight v. 146919 Canada Ltd (1991), 1991 CarswellOnt 527, 35 C.C.E.L.
282, 40 E.T.R. 184, [1991] O.J. No. 136 (Ont. Gen. Div.); affirmed (1993), 1993
CarswellOnt 938, 46 C.C.E.L. 271, C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8150 (Ont. C.A.); leave to
appeal refused (1994), 7 C.C.E.L. (2d) 44 (note), 75 O.A.C. 160 (note), 176 N.R.
318 (note) (S.C.C.).
99 Although, discriminatory provisions in a trust may be voided by courts on the basis
of being against public policy or statutory human rights provisions: see, e.g., Canada
Trust Co. v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 481, 1990
CarswellOnt 486, 69 D.L.R. (4th) 321, 12 C.H.R.R. D/184, 38 E.T.R. 1, (sub nom.
Leonard Foundation Trust, Re) 37 O.A.C. 191 (Ont. C.A.).
100 Charity Commission, “Guidance on Programme-Related Investment”, (May 2001)
online: www.charitycommission.gov.uk/supportingcharities/casi.asp.
101 Palmer, et al., supra, n. 61 at 106.
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ments that purport to authorize investments not consistent with the
objects of the trust may be impeachable.102
In conclusion, SRI policies can meld with fiduciary responsibilities.
But, they normally cannot sacrifice financial returns unless the govern-
ing trust instrument gives primacy to non-financial goals. Yet, as shown
in the foregoing discussion, the dichotomy between SRI and fiduciary
investment standards may be non-existent. Many methods of SRI such
as shareholder activism can actually fulfill fiduciary responsibilities.
Further, fiduciaries should pay attention to significant environmental
risks that may impact financial performance. However, because of the
arbitrary and subjective nature of some SRI compared to the seeming
clarity of traditional fund management objectives to optimize financial
returns, explicit guidance on SRI in regulation or the governing trust
instruments would be helpful.
The next section of this article examines in detail how fiduciary
responsibilities and SRI interact in relation to occupational pension
funds in common law jurisdictions. We must examine how the specific
institutional and legal characteristics of investment intermediaries affect
SRI.
4. PENSION FUNDS
(a) Basic Principles
An occupational pension fund is a financial institution established
by employers and workers to pay benefits upon the retirement of fund
members. By virtue of the huge capital resources they command, pension
funds are potentially the most influential financial institution for SRI.103
Hawley and Williams contend that because pension funds and other
institutional investors are “universal owners”. As they hold a broad
portfolio of stocks and other assets, they are inherently biased towards
102 Ibid.
103 See I. Carmichael, Pension Power: Unions, Pension Funds, and Social Investment
in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005); A. Read, “Building Sign-
posts for the Future: Investment Strategy, Socially Responsible Investing, and
ERISA” (1997) 23 Journal of Pension Planning and Compliance 39; A. Neale,
“Pension Funds and Socially Responsible Investment” (2001) 1(2) Journal of Cor-
porate Citizenship 43.
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the health and long-term sustainability of the entire economy rather than
just the profitability of individual firms.104 This is further reinforced by
the long-term nature of pension funds’ financial liabilities. Apart from
a good retirement income, pension fund members also desire a clean,
safe and secure world. Given the ubiquity of pension fund membership,
the interests of members should be broadly consistent with those of the
society in which members live.
Similarly, Monks contends that the universal investor (or “global
investors” as he calls them) “is likely to make good decisions for the
long-term of society, because it can afford in most cases to take a long-
term view, and a diversified view. An ordinary domestic investor may
need to reap profits in the short term”.105 Gifford adds that given the
ubiquity and size of pension fund holdings, they:
generally prefer indexing strategies, in which they invest in almost every stock
in the market to match a major market index. Therefore, if one company causes
environmental damage, another company will often suffer, and that company will
also be in the fund’s portfolio so it is a zero sum game for the fund. Similarly, if
the environmental cost is externalised onto the taxpayer (i.e. to clean up a toxic
waste site), those taxpayers will most likely also be members of the fund.106
Thus, in theory, pension funds should be particularly attentive to
the social and environmental performance of their investee companies,
even if it means that a particular company must be divested from the
fund’s portfolio.
Occupational pension funds in common law jurisdictions are com-
monly established under a trust arrangement.107 Typically, the employer,
as settlor, vests the pension fund and its earnings in one or more pension
trustees on behalf of employee beneficiaries. Trustees have legal title to
the fund’s assets and consequently have power over the investment and
management of those assets. Pension fund and trustee legislation gen-
erally do not specify the types of investments that a fiduciary must make.
Rather, trustees of pension funds enjoy a plenary power to invest in any
104 Hawley & Williams, supra, n. 79.
105 Monks, supra, n. 79 at 105.
106 J. Gifford, “Measuring the Social, Environmental and Ethical Performance of Pen-
sion Funds” (2004) 53 Journal of Australian Political Economy 139 at 140-41.
107 E.E. Gillese, “Pension Plans and the Law of Trusts” (1996) 75 Can. Bar Rev. 221;
L. Millett, “Pension Schemes and the Law of Trusts: The Tail Wagging The Dog?”
(2000) 14(2) Trust L. Int’l.
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type of investment subject to restrictions imposed by the governing trust
deed, their fiduciary obligations and government regulations.108
A further seminal consideration is that a pension plan is not merely
a trust; it is also a contract. Indeed, where there is no evidence of an
intention to establish a trust, contract law and any applicable public
regulation govern arrangements.109 A pension plan is a contract between
an employer and its employees, and forms a valuable component of the
contract of employment.110 Therefore, pension rights established under
contract can arise independently of rights established under other legal
mechanisms such as a trust. It is therefore possible that pension plan
members could acquire specific rights regarding investment policies of
their pension plan by contract.
Scholars are divided on the relationship between contract law and
fiduciary investment duties. Maxton and Farrar believe courts should
look at the contractual framework when considering whether pension
trusts can engage in SRI.111 On the other hand, Ali and Yano contend
that “investors do not have the right to dictate the design and implemen-
tation of the fund’s investment strategy to the fiduciary”.112 This is
because, in their opinion, “it is a well established principle of trust law
that a fiduciary cannot fetter the exercise of its investment powers and
thus enter into an arrangement or adopt an inflexible investment policy
that is determinative of the future exercise of its investment powers”.113
However, original contractural provisions governing workers’ pension
rights, such as those contained in a collective bargaining agreement,
would be matters that the employer as the settlor would have to incor-
porate into the terms of the pension trust governing the fiduciary.
108 A standard trust deed contains details of the rights, powers, and remuneration of the
trustee(s), details of benefits of members, winding up provisions, disclosure, record
keeping and actuarial review. See, e.g., Trustee Act 2000 (UK), c. 29 ss. 3(1) and
6(1)(b); Pensions Act 1995 (UK), c. 26, s. 34(1).
109 A.N. Kaplan, Pension Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) at 17.
110 Ibid., at 13.
111 J.H. Farrar & J.K. Maxton, “Social Investment and Pension Scheme Trusts” (1986)
102 Law Q. Rev. 32 (discussing the UK case of Cowan v. Scargill, 1984).
112 Ali & Yano, supra, n. 1 at 140.
113 Ibid, citing among authorities, Gibson’s Settlement Trusts, Re, [1981] Ch. 179
(U.K.), and Allen-Meyrick’s Will Trusts, Re, [1966] 1 W.L.R. 499.
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The interests of employees are further enhanced by the growing
shift from defined-benefit to defined-contribution pension plans.114 In a
defined-benefit plan, retirement benefits are pre-determined by a for-
mula usually based on the employee’s length of service multiplied by a
certain percentage. In the contrasting defined-contribution pension plan,
the employee’s contribution rates are fixed by the plan and the retirement
benefits paid depend on the performance of the plan. Hybrid pension
plans can combine elements of both models.115 Historically, most pen-
sion plans offered defined benefits. In the wake of fluctuating stock
market returns and greater market uncertainty, which make it difficult
to guarantee returns, many companies have sought to convert their pen-
sion plans to defined-contribution schemes.116
The choice of a defined-benefit or defined-contribution plan has
different financial risk implications. With a defined-benefit plan, the
employer or plan sponsor bears the primary risk that employees receive
a pre-defined pension income on retirement.117 A defined-contribution
plan shifts that risk to the employees. Arguably, therefore, those em-
ployees should concomitantly acquire greater rights over the pension
plan’s choice of investments including SRI options (though whether
employees would be more willing to sacrifice returns on their retirement
benefits is debatable).118 Where the employer guarantees retirement ben-
efits, it is understandable that the employer may wish to exclude SRI if
that option would materially risk lower investment returns.119
Although trustees appointed by the employer or other plan sponsors
bear legal responsibility for controlling the assets of the trusts, trustees
of pension plans often delegate aspects of investment decision-making
114 On this shift, see A. Byrne, “Investment Decision Making in Defined Contribution
Plans” (2004) 10(1) Pensions: An International Journal 37.
115 Kaplan, supra, n. 109 at 101-02.
116 Ibid., at 4.
117 However, even with a defined-benefit model, employees face some risks; their
pension contributions may rise to meet liabilities, and the employer may go bank-
rupt.
118 R.A.G. Monks & N. Minow, Power and Accountability (New York: Harper Collins,
1991) at 223.
119 Interestingly, however, UK research suggests the recent shift to defined contribution
schemes may discourage SRI because where members are given investment choices
they tend to be more risk-averse and therefore choose bonds rather than equities.
There is less scope for SRI in the bond market: Palmer, et al., supra, n. 61 at 126.
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to professional fund managers.120 An investment managementagreement
typically governs the relationship between trustees and their fund man-
agers.121 Legislation typically makes fund managers effectively subject
to the same prudential investment obligations as trustees.122 Moreover,
fund managers often have a contractual obligation to provide services
or advice that enable trustees to meet their fiduciary duties. Thereby,
fund managers must respect fiduciary duties of trustees.123 Fund man-
agers also have a general contractual duty at common law to apply due
skill and care.124
Pension funds invest in capital markets, particularly stocks, bonds
and real estate.125 Pension trustees have customarily resisted ethically
based investments in the belief that they contravene fiduciary duties
prevalent in trust law.126 However, as the next section shows, little case
law supports this assumption.
The following sections canvass developments in the UK, US and
Australia, where there have been the most active litigation and legislative
interest in SRI issues. There is no Canadian case law on SRI by pension
funds or other investment institutions.
(b) UK Case Law
In Britain, the question of whether fiduciary responsibilities of
investment trustees allow them to invest ethically was considered in the
120 K.P. Ambachtsteer & D. Ezra, Pension Fund Excellence: Creating Value for Stock-
holders (New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 1998) at 67-71.
121 See generally S. Willey, “Investment Management and Fiduciary Duties” in D.
Frase (ed.) Law and Regulation of Investment Management (London: Sweet and
Maxwell, 2004).
122 E.g., UK’s Pensions Act 1995, s. 36 (duties to assess the suitability of each invest-
ment and have regard to the need for diversification).
123 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, supra, n. 11 at 85.
124 Ibid., at 91.
125 See generally G.L. Clark, Pension Fund Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000).
126 See A. Emid, “The Ethical Choice: It Takes a Steady Hand to Balance Fiduciary
Responsibility with Ethical Goals” (1997) 21(4) Benefits Canada 89; Hutchinson
& Cole, supra, n. 1; D. Hayton, “English Fiduciary Standards and Trust Law”
(1999) 32 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 555.
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cases of Cowan v. Scargill,127 Martin v. Edinburgh (City) District Coun-
cil128 and Bishop of Oxford v. England (Church Commissioner).129
The first of these cases, Cowan v. Scargill, attracted considerable
attention from SRI commentators.130 Trustees appointed jointly by the
National Coal Board (NCB) and the National Union of Mine Workers
governed the pension plan in question. Union trustees disapproved of
the proposed investment plan unless it prohibited any increase in foreign
investment, in particular, any investment in energy industries in com-
petition with coal. The NCB trustees commenced legal proceedings
against union trustees claiming that they were in breach of fiduciary
duties by insisting on the proposed restrictions.
The judge, Vice-Chancellor Robert Megarry, agreed with the NCB
trustees. Starting from the proposition that trustees must treat interests
of beneficiaries as paramount, he reasoned that the best interests of the
beneficiaries were normally their financial interests.131 If the only actual
or potential beneficiaries of a trust were individuals with strict views on
moral or social matters, Megarry V-C conceded that it would be under-
standable that it might not be for the “benefit” of such beneficiaries to
invest to maximize financial return. Finally, Megarry V-C emphasized
the applicable statutory duty to have regard to the need for diversification
of investments. Non-financial criteria could be considered in diversifi-
cation assuming there were equally beneficial alternatives.
Despite the attention given to the Cowan case, it is not a significant
precedent and has at times been misinterpreted.132 Megarry V-C was a
sole judge sitting in the Chancery Division of the High Court, the lowest
tier of the higher English civil law courts. Also, the question of whether
taking social, environmental and ethical considerations into account
might improve investment return never arose in the case. What the
Megarry V-C judgment does exclude is SRI decisions based on the
127 [1985] 1 Ch. 270 (U.K.) [Cowan].
128 [1988] S.L.T. 329.
129 [1992] 1 W.L.R. 1241 (U.K.); [1993] 2 All E.R. 300 (U.K.) [Bishop of Oxford].
130 E.g., P. Docking & I. Pittaway, “Social Investment by English Pension Funds: Can
it Be Done?” (1990) Trust Law and Practice 25.
131 Cowan, supra, n. 127.
132 For criticisms of Megarry’s judgment, see Maxton & Farrar, supra, n. 111.
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“personal interests and views” of the trustees, which can “not be justified
on broad economic grounds”.133
Curiously, Megarry V-C himself reflected on his decision in a 1989
academic article.134 He explained that his judgment in Cowan did not
mean profit maximization alone was consistent with the fiduciary duties
of a pension fund trustee. Moreover, he wrote that if the trustees in
Cowan had framed their investment policy as a preference rather than
an absolute prohibition, then it would have been difficult to admonish.
In the next British case, the Bishop of Oxford and some fellow
clergy sought a declaration that Church of England Commissioners
should not invest in a manner incompatible with the Christian faith when
managing their assets, even if there was a risk of significant financial
detriment.135 The Court found that the Commissioners were in the same
position as trustees with respect to the fund in question. And though the
Commissioners had an ethical investment policy, it was to apply only
to the extent that such considerations did not significantly jeopardize
financial returns.
In declining to approve the more activist approach sought by the
Bishop of Oxford,136 Nicholls V-C accepted that there were at least two
exceptions to the duty to maximize financial returns. Namely, where the
aims of the charity and objects of investment conflict and, where partic-
ular investments detract from the charity’s work, trustees must weigh
the extent of financial loss from offended supporters and the financial
risk of exclusion.137 Thus, in his reasoning, if trustees sought professional
advice and were choosing between two investments, which according
to conventional principles of prudential investment were equally suita-
ble, then ethical considerations could be the deciding factor (“the tie-
133 Cowan, supra, n. 127 at 296.
134 R. Megarry, “Investing Pension Funds: The Mineworkers Case” in TG Youdan
(ed.), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) 149.
135 Bishop of Oxford, supra, n. 129.
136 The Church Commissioners’ investment policy already excluded investment in 13%
(by value) of publicly listed UK companies, while the Bishop of Oxford proposed
further ethical exclusions which would have increased the level of exclusion to 37%
of the total market: G. Watt, Trusts and Equity, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press 2006) at 436.
137 Bishop of Oxford v. England (Church Commissioners), [1993] 2 All E.R. 300 (U.K.)
at 304.
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breaker principle”). However, whether such principles apply to all in-
vestment trusts such as pension plans is unclear. Nicholls V-C cautioned
that this case involved charities whose “purposes are multifarious”,
unlike other “trusts for the provision of financial benefits for individu-
als”.138
In the Scottish case of Martin v. Edinburgh (City) District Council,
the majority of the Edinburgh District Council trustees decided to divest
from South Africa because of apartheid.139 In a successful challenge to
this policy, the court concluded that the trustees of the municipality’s
fund breached the trust by implementing a policy of divestment without
considering whether it was in the best interests of the beneficiaries and
without obtaining professional advice. However, the court did not con-
sider whether such an investment policy was contrary to trust principles
per se; rather, it addressed only whether the failure to consider the issue
constituted a breach of the trustee’s duties. But, significantly, Lord
Murray commented:
I cannot conceive that trustees have an unqualified duty simply to invest trust
funds in the most profitable investment available. To accept that without quali-
fication would, in my view, involve substituting the discretion of financial advi-
sers for the discretion of trustees.140
In a further circumvention of the Cowan ruling, Lord Murray also
rejected the notion that trustees must rid themselves of all personal
preferences; rather, “What he must do ... is to recognise that he has those
preferences, commitments or principles but nonetheless do his best to
exercise fair and impartial judgment on the merits of the issue before
him”.141
Since these cases, the Trustee Act 2000 has amended the powers
and duties of trustees. Previously, the Trustee Investments Act 1961,
now repealed, restricted trustees to certain types of supposed “safe”
assets, such as gilt-edged securities and bank accounts. The Trustee Act
2000 – which governs trusts generally rather than pension plans specif-
ically – makes no express reference to SRI. The legislation does, how-
ever, require trustees to consider the “suitability” of investments when
138 Ibid.
139 [1988] S.L.T. 329.
140 Ibid., at 334.
141 Ibid.
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exercising their investment powers,142 and the Charity Commission’s
initial guidance on the Act’s key provisions explained that suitability
“will . . . include any relevant ethical considerations as to the kind of
investments which it is appropriate for the trust to make”.143
More relevant to the pension sector, the Pensions Act 1995144 and
its subordinate regulations145 insist trustees’ powers of investment “be
exercised in a manner calculated to ensure the security, quality, liquidity
and profitability of the portfolio as a whole”.146 Also, the assets must be
invested “in the best interests of members and beneficiaries”,147 and
“must be properly diversified”.148 Further, the trustees must: obtain
proper advice when preparing their statement of investment principles,149
and act in accordance with those principles as far as practicable.150
Notably, recent Pensions Act amendments (2004) do not address
the culture of passive investing and lack of corporate engagement of
British pension funds, which was one of the findings of the 2001 Myners
review of institutional investment in the UK.151 The UK Department of
Work and Pensions subsequently proposed a legal duty that pension
fund administrators “must, in respect of any company or undertaking ...
in which they invest such assets, use such rights and powers as arise by
virtue of such investment in the best interests of the members and
beneficiaries of such scheme”.152 This proposal would have generated
greater shareholder activism beneficial to SRI but was not legislated into
practice. Instead, the matter was left for voluntary action pursuant to the
Myners Code of Investment Principles.153
142 Section 4.
143 Online: Charity Commission www.charity-commission.gov.uk/supportingcharities/
default.asp.
144 See sections 33-36.
145 Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) Regulations, Statutory Instrument
2005 No. 3378, cl. 4(3).
146 Ibid., cl. 4.
147 Ibid., cl. 4(2)(a).
148 Ibid., cl. 4(7).
149 Ibid., cl. 2(2)(a).
150 Pensions Act 1995, c. 26, s. 36(5).
151 Myners, supra, n. 92.
152 Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), Encouraging Shareholder Activism: A
Consultation Document (London: DWP, 2002) 8.
153 HM Treasury, Myners Principles for Institutional Investment Decision-Making:
Review of Progress (London: HM Treasury, 2004).
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On the other hand, UK legislators pioneered a potentially crucial
innovation: in 2000, regulations under the Pensions Act came into effect
requiring trustees of all occupational pension plans to disclose whether
the plan has an ethical investment policy. The details and impact of that
reform are discussed in the final section of this article.
Finally, it must be noted that UK pensions and financial regulation
is also increasingly shaped by European Union regulation, such as the
Occupational Pensions Fund Directive.154 This Directive inter alia im-
poses modern prudent investment standards already familiar to UK do-
mestic law.155
(c) US Pension Funds
Pensions legislation and case law in the US contains similar in-
vestment rules and standards to that found in the UK. The federal Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act 1974 (ERISA) outlines general
standards of fiduciary conduct for private occupational pension plans.156
Principally, it requires that plan trustees and their investment managers
exercise their responsibilities:
1. “Solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries”;
2. “For the exclusive purpose of providing benefits” and “defray-
ing reasonable expenses of administering the plan”;
3. “With the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circum-
stances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like ca-
pacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct
of an enterprise of a like character with like aims”;
4. “By diversifying investments . . . so as to minimize the risk of
large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent
not to do so”; and
5. In accordance with plan documents.157
154 Supra, n. 66.
155 Ibid., Article 18 (the Directive is most relevant to the civil law EU jurisdictions
which have historically favoured quantitative investment rules rather than prudent
investment standards).
156 ERISA, s. 404.
157 Ibid.
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The ERISA does not explicitly refer to the possibility of SRI, and
so the matter has been left to the courts and the guidance issued by the
US Department of Labor. The Department has issued various non-bind-
ing Interpretative Bulletins that touch on SRI.158 For instance, it has
advised that shareholder activism is:
consistent with a fiduciary’s obligations under ERISA where the responsible
fiduciary concludes that there is a reasonable expectation that such monitoring or
communication with management, by the plan alone or together with other share-
holders, is likely to enhance the value of the plan’s investment in the corporation,
after taking into account the costs involved.159
For federal government pension plans, a bill for a Federal Employ-
ees Responsible Investment Act was introduced in the US House of
Representatives in 2004.160 If passed, the law would compel government
pension plans to offer an SRI index fund option in the Thrift Savings
Plan for all federal employees.161
The most significant US case on SRI was the Board of Trustees of
Employee Retirement System of Baltimore (City) v. Baltimore (City).162
This case dealt with a public sector pension plan, though governed by
common law fiduciary duties considered similar to ERISA standards.
Here the Maryland Court of Appeal examined the City’s ordinances
requiring its four municipal pension funds to divest from companies
engaged in business in South Africa. The trustees argued that the ordi-
nance altered their common law duties of prudence by substantially
reducing the universe of eligible investments.
While the court in Baltimore (City) agreed that the ordinances
excluded a “not insignificant segment of the investment universe”,163 it
accepted evidence that the lowering of the rate of return expected from
158 US Department of Labor, Interpretative Bulletin (Interpretative bulletin relating to
statements of investment policy, including proxy voting policy or guidelines), Code
of Federal Regulations, 29 Ch XXV, 2509. 94-2 (1994).
159 Ibid.
160 H.R. 4140, online: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108: H.R.4140.IH:.
In May 2005 the bill was Referred to the House Committee on Government Reform.
161 The TSP is a retirement savings plan for civilians employed by the US federal
government and members of the armed services. The Federal Retirement Thrift
Investment Board administers the TSP in accordance with the Federal Employees’
Retirement System Act 1986.
162 317 Md. 72, 562 A.2d 720 (1989).
163 Ibid., at 103.
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the divestiture in South Africa would only amount to about ten basis
points per year,164 and the measured way the divestments were to occur
meant that the divesture program did not alter the trustees’ prudential
duties. The court explained: “Thus, if ... social investment yields eco-
nomically competitive returns at a comparable level of risk, the invest-
ment should not be deemed imprudent”.165
Trustees also argued that the ordinances altered the common law
duty of loyalty, because no longer would investment occur exclusively
for providing benefits to members. Again, the court found this provision
did not cause trustees to violate their investment duties so long as the
cost of investing according to social responsibility precepts was de
minimis, as was considered here. The court explained that a trustee’s
duty is not to maximize return on investments, but only to secure a “just”
and “reasonable” return, while avoiding undue risk.166
Interestingly, the Maryland Court of Appeal also expressly recog-
nized the relevance and influence of public opinion in the selection of
investments:
The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore were motivated to enact the Ordinances
in part, because the Trustees’ prior investment practices offended a growing
number of the systems’ beneficiaries and residents of the City. Moreover, given
the vast power that pension trust funds exert in American society, it would be
unwise to bar trustees from considering the social consequences of investment
decisions in any case in which it would cost even a penny more to do so.167
Although not strictly an SRI case, the decision in Withers v. Teach-
ers’ Retirement System168 also suggests the US courts’ willingness to
condone pension trustees who take collateral issues into account when
determining the long-term, best interests of plan beneficiaries. There,
trustees of a teachers’ pension fund invested US$860 million in bonds
issued by the City of New York, under which there was no guarantee of
a return as the bond issue was an attempt to prevent the looming bank-
ruptcy of the City. The City was also the major employer of the teachers
and, as a substantial contributor to their fund, was the ultimate guarantor
164 Basis points are the smallest measure used to calculate interest rates or yields on
investments. For example, ten basis points equal 0.1 percent.
165 Ibid., at 107.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid., at 108.
168 447 F. Supp. 148 (SDNT, 1978).
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of the liabilities of the fund. After much research, the trustees were
satisfied that the City could not obtain financing from other sources.
The court held in those circumstances that the seemingly speculative
investment made by the trustees was acceptable because of the strong
connection between the fund and the City.
Though some critics distinguish the Withers case based on its ex-
ceptional facts,169 where the pension plan’s survival was dependent on
the solvency of the municipality invested in, the recent spate of corporate
insolvencies and underfunded pension plans suggests that the Withers
situation is not unique. The latitude conceded to trustees in Withers was
also influenced by the absence of any conflicts of interest. In contrast,
conflicts of interest were determinative in Blankenship v. Boyle.170 Here,
the union pension plan trustees were condemned for holding assets in a
union-owned bank for the benefit of the bank.
(d) Australian Superannuation Funds
Australian occupational pension plans (known locally as “super-
annuation funds”) are governed primarily by the Superannuation Indus-
try (Supervision) Act 1993 (SIS Act). Concomitant common law duties
may apply to superannuation funds. Applicable policy guidance mainly
comprises the Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s
(ASIC) Policy Statements.171 Australian courts have not yet considered
the legality of SRI by superannuation funds or SRI in other investment
contexts. Legal commentators suggest that English cases provide the
best guidance on how Australian courts would deal with the issues.172
It is unclear to what extent Australian superannuation legislation
allows SRI. Section 62 of SIS Act – the most important provision in this
respect – is entitled by the statute as the “Sole Purpose Test”. It provides,
in part, that:
(1) Each trustee of a regulated superannuation fund must ensure that the fund is
maintained solely:
169 Hutchinson & Cole, supra, n. 1 at 1363; Langbein & Posner, supra, n. 1.
170 329 F. Supp. 1089 (1979) at 1112.
171 See online: ASIC www.asic.gov.au.
172 Ali & Kano supra, n. 1; A. Leigh, “‘Caveat Investor’: The Ethical Investment of
Superannuation in Australia” (1997) 25 Austl. Bus. L. Rev. 341; G.E. Dal-Pont,
“Conflicting Signals for the Trustees’ Duty to Invest” (1996) 24(2) Austl. Bus. L.
Rev. 140.
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(a) for one or more of the following purposes:
(i) the provision of benefits for each member of the fund on or after
the member’s retirement from any business
The SIS Act also mandates that funds implement specific invest-
ment principles. These include acting in the best interests of the bene-
ficiaries, diversifying investments, and ensuring the fund can discharge
its existing and prospective liabilities to manage reserves responsibly.173
These provisions draw on the common law duties of trustees to invest
prudently and loyally for the benefit of the fund members. Overall, then,
it would seem that the trustee of a superannuation fund must ensure that
the fund is maintained solely for generating and providing monetary
benefits174 to members upon retirement, which cannot be overridden by
the terms of a fund’s trust deed.175
Non-adherence of this sole purpose standard might therefore occur
where there is no retirement purpose behind an investment. For instance,
a commentator for the Australian Council of Superannuation Investors
advises: “an investment in an environmentally screened portfolio that is
not expected to provide a return to members but rather fund anti-logging
protest activities would be blatantly inconsistent with the sole purpose
test”.176 The former Insurance and Superannuation Commission viewed
section 62 as excluding non-financial investment criteria unless they
were material to financial risk.177
173 SIS Act, ss. 7 and 52(2).
174 The statute does not however define “benefits”, though it can be implied that benefits
are of a monetary kind.
175 SIS Act, ss. 7 and 52. In the absence of express incorporation, section 52 of the SIS
Act deems such covenants as included in the governing rules of the fund.
176 P. Spathis, “Corporate Governance and Superannuation Trustees” (Dec. 2001) Cor-
porate Citizenship: A Newsletter of the Australian Council of Superannuation In-
vestors 32-33.
177 Insurance and Superannuation Commission (ISC), Superannuation Circular III.A.4.
The Sole Purpose Test and Ancillary Purposes (Canberra: ISC, 1995). Within
Australia, the Accounting Standard 1031 provides guidance on quantitative thresh-
olds for determining the materiality of an item such as environmental risk. Issued
by the Australian Accounting Standards Board, the Standard 1031 defines materi-
ality as meaning: “that information which if omitted, misstated or not disclosed has
the potential to adversely affect decisions about the allocation of scarce resources
made by users of the financial report or the discharge of accountability by the
management or governing body of the entity”.
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However, Leigh contends that section 62 of the SIS Act can be
interpreted to allow trustees to make non-financial considerations.178 He
argues the test under section 62 should be interpreted as a dominant
purpose (rather than a sole purpose)179 which enables superannuation
fund trustees to take social or environmental factors into account. Their
“dominant” goal must be the provision of monetary benefits to members
upon retirement. Leigh creatively argues that another way for superan-
nuation fund managers wishing to invest ethically to comply with section
62 would be to interpret “purpose” as an end rather than a means.180 He
cites the judgment of Davies J. in Raymor Contractors Pty Ltd. v. Federal
Commissioner for Taxation, who stated: “[T]he word ‘purpose’ has a
meaning which is readily understood. It refers to the end in view. When
used in a statute, the term requires an act or transaction to have the object
of achieving the end specified by the statute”.181 Similarly, Leigh con-
tends that SRI is simply a means to an end (i.e., the provision of retire-
ment benefits to members), rather than an end in itself.
It can also be argued that the 2001 amendments to the Corporations
Act, introducing UK-style obligations regarding mandatory disclosure
of any environmental or ethical investment policy, implicitly authorize
SRI. The nature of this seminal reform is examined later in this article.
Another key recent reform is the Superannuation Legislation Amend-
ment (Choice of Superannuation Funds) Act 2005. Since July 1, 2005
employees have been allowed to choose where their contributions to
superannuation funds are invested. It enables employees to choose su-
perannuation funds that adopt SRI strategies. Several companies and
organizations were already offering SRI options before the legislative
amendment.182
Even though neither of these two reforms speaks directly to fidu-
ciary responsibilities, they imply that SRI is a perfectly acceptable form
of pension fund investment. Some lawyers doubt that the courts would
178 Leigh, supra, n. 172 at 343.
179 Leigh cites the judgment of Pincus J. in Federal Commissioner for Taxation v.
Roche (1991), A.T.C. 5024 at 5027, as supporting this interpretation of s. 62.
180 Leigh, supra, n. 172 at 343.
181 (1991), A.T.C. 4259 at 4260.
182 For example, the Health Employees Superannuation Trust of Australia (HESTA)
offers an environmental screened investment strategy in a choice of options that
commenced in early 2000, online: www.hesta.com.au.
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accept that argument. Donnan points out that the Corporations Act
disclosure laws relate only to disclosure and not to the broader regulatory
regime and general legal principles under which funds operate.183
The Australian superannuation industry has become more tolerant
of SRI after years of disinterest or even opposition. According to an
advisory statement of the Association of Superannuation Funds of Aus-
tralia, the main requirements for a fund desiring to invest ethically are:184
i. Unreduced expected return
An SRI policy must not lower the expected return of the plan’s assets. If the plan
carried an expected return shortfall against the broad market, it would be difficult
for trustees to justify this policy while at the same time proving they are acting
in the best interests of the plan beneficiaries.
ii. Effective diversification
Restrictions imposed by the SRI policy should not be so constraining that the
fund is inadequately diversified.
iii. Implementability
Trustees need to check whether the policy can be implemented without introduc-
ing unacceptable risk exposures and burdensome administrative procedures. For
example, some SRI policies lead to a portfolio biased towards medium and smaller
capitalisation companies, introducing an element of risk into a portfolio and
leading to periods of under-performance, even if there is no loss of long-term
expected return.
iv. Member acceptance
Trustees must ensure that an SRI policy has wide acceptance from members,
otherwise they risk assuming their social, ethical and environmental views are
shared by the membership.
v. Documentation
Adequate and up-to-date documentation is vital and trustees should maintain
proper records of their decisions and the grounds on which they are made. Inde-
pendent investment advisers also have an important role to play in providing
advice and independent view.
These are expectations that would also seem applicable to other juris-
dictions.
183 J. Donnan, “Regulating ethical investment: Disclosure under the Financial Services
Reform Act” (2002) 13(3) Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 155
at 170.
184 Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA), “Development of ASFA
Policy on ‘Ethical Investment’” (Sydney: ASFA, October 2000) 8.
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(e) Conclusions
While no common law jurisdiction formally prohibits pension
funds from socially responsible investing, some investment advisors and
legal commentators see the governing legal principles as precluding
SRI. However, the extant case law hardly supports this view. The ac-
ceptability of SRI will surely widen if SRI funds consistently match or
exceed the returns of other investment choices.185
Preferably pension funds wishing to invest responsibly should have
an explicit mandate in their governing plan thereby avoiding potential
legal obstacles. Trustees exercising fiduciary investment powers must
exercise those powers for the purpose for which they were granted.
Where there is no express SRI mandate, fiduciary obligationswould
appear to be satisfied so long as: the SRI policy is not predicted to unduly
lower the expected return of the pension plan’s assets; there is sufficient
portfolio diversification; trustees have taken proper investment advice
and have consulted with their fund membership; and, the policy can be
implemented without burdensome and costly administrative procedures.
Alternatively, a pension fund could follow a standard investment process
but rely on shareholder engagement to influence companies to improve
their environmental and social performance.
5. REFORMING FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SRI
(a) Underlying Principles
While the preceding discussion reveals to some extent a synergy
between fiduciary investment standards and SRI in the pension sector,
SRI remains pitifully small and pension fund trustees are still often
taciturn to invest responsibly. Arguably, market forces rather than law
itself poses the greatest hindrance to SRI. Capitalism is intertwined with
185 See, e.g., M.V. Russo & P.A. Fouts, “A Resource-Based Perspective on Corporate
Environmental Performance and Profitability” (1997) 40(3) Academy of Manage-
ment Journal 534; J. James, “The Calculus of Conscience: Socially-responsible
Investing can be both Profitable and Ethical” (2000) 156(6) Times International 33;
R.M. Roman, S. Hayibor & R.A. Bradley, “The Relationship Between Social and
Financial Performance: Repainting a Portrait” (1999) 38(1) Business and Society
109.
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our worst environmental problems.186 Growth of financial markets has
been closely associated with more volatile, speculative and short-term
investment, typically running counter to socially just and environmen-
tally sustainable development.187
Some commentators nonetheless view pension funds as an excep-
tion to this malign view of the financial sector.188 Pension funds are seen
as an ideal vehicle for SRI because they have long-term financial liabil-
ities that encourage long-term investment horizons. They do not compete
for business (unlike retail mutual funds), they cater to ordinary workers,
and they are typically not tainted by collateral business ties to their
investee companies (unlike the case of banks and insurance companies
that may offer additional business services to clients they finance –
though with the integration of the financial sector in the early 1990s,
banks and insurance affiliates are also starting to manage pension funds).
However, this optimistic view does not take into account the practice of
pension funds to invest through intermediaries such as asset management
companies.189 These financial intermediaries tend to have much nar-
rower and short-term investment perspectives.
Relying on a free market approach to SRI in the pensions sector
(and among other institutional investors) is of concern. Capital markets
systematically fail to address many social and environmental costs.
Numerous studies highlight market failures to acknowledge environ-
mental impacts, including undervaluing ecological properties, and dis-
counting future environmental costs and benefits.190 Because the finan-
cial sector promotes and profits from economic growth, it should share
186 See especially J. McMurtry, The Cancer Stage of Capitalism (London: Pluto Press,
1998).
187 A. Harmes, Unseen Power: How Mutual Funds Threaten the Political and Economic
Wealth of Nations (Toronto: Stoddard, 2001) at 76; K.A. Froot, D.S. Schartfstein
& J.C. Stein, “Herd on the Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a Market with
Short-Term Speculation” (1992) 47 Journal of Finance 1461; R.J. Shiller, Irrational
Exuberance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
188 I. Carmichael, Pension Power: Unions, Pension Funds, and Social Investment in
Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).
189 C. Mackenzie, “The Scope for Investor Action on Corporate Social and Environ-
mental Impacts”, in R. Sullivan & C. MacKenzie (eds.) Responsible Investment
(Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing 2005) 20.
190 See R. Costanza, et al., An Introduction to Ecological Economics (Boca Raton: St.
Lucie Press, 1997).
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responsibility for ensuring such development meets society’s environ-
mental and social goals and standards.191 If investors were more sensitive
to sustainable development, then probably so too would the companies
in which they invest.
Presumably, if market regulation were perfect, in the sense that
businesses were required to account for all of their social and environ-
mental impacts, then there would probably not be an SRI movement as
we know it. There would be little need for SRI, as the value of companies
would reflect their full social and environmental costs and benefits. SRI
would be confined to addressing corporate governance failures and a
small purely ethical investment sector making investments on religious
and other ethical grounds with little regard for financial considerations.
For several reasons, attacking the problem directly by prohibiting
harmful corporate behaviour through regulation has proven an insuffi-
cient solution. Financial markets are global, and pension funds like other
financiers invest increasingly in international markets beyond the reach
of home state regulation. For instance, Canada cannot regulate environ-
mental activities of non-Canadian companies operating in other coun-
tries. However, they may be able to influence their activities by targeting
Canadian-based financial sponsors. But even within narrower and easier
parameters of domestic social and environmental regulation, govern-
ments have failed to realign economies towards sustainable development
worldwide.192 Despite several decades of legislative reform, major in-
ternational environmental studies testify to continuing environmental
decline in nearly all countries.193 Perhaps a new approach that targets
the underlying processes of capital allocation may make more significant
progress.
For the state to direct the allocation of capital in support of social
and environmental causes would be politically unviable. It could also
engender major economic inefficiencies given that regulators typically
191 See J. Rada & A. Trisoglio, “Capital Markets and Sustainable Development” (1992)
27(3/4) Columbia Journal of World Business 42; W.L. Thomas, “The Green Nexus:
Financiers and Sustainable Development” (2001) 13 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 899.
192 See especially B.J. Richardson & S. Wood (eds.), Environmental Law for Sustain-
ability: A Reader (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006).
193 See, by way of introduction, Worldwatch Institute, The State of the World 2003
(Washington DC: Worldwatch Institute, 2003).
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lack the required information and expertise. Financial reform in OECD
countries has tended to heed the “financial repression” thesis, namely,
that state economic intervention to control where money flows, risks
provoking capital flight, fragmented markets and other inefficiencies.194
In such a hazardous regulatory and political milieu, SRI-based regulation
should probably aim (at least for the moment) to promote informational,
incentive and other procedural mechanisms to nurture the conditions for
SRI among pension funds and other investors. However, if the gravity
of our social and environmental problems worsens, more interventionist
reforms to promote SRI may be viable. The following sections canvass
potential reforms.
(b) SRI as a “Material” or Discretionary Concern
Fiduciary duties are not static, and have evolved to reflect changing
social norms and values. Over fifty years ago, for instance, fiduciary
duties were held by British courts to preclude municipal authorities from
applying a standard minimum wage for adult men and women and
providing subsidized public transport.195 In this vein, fiduciary duties
can be reformed again to address SRI considerations.
Regulation to encourage SRI could enable institutional investors,
even without an explicit mandate by contract or trust deed, to lawfully
take social, ethical and environmental factors into account, if such factors
have a material bearing on financial returns and risks.196 For example,
trustees of a pension fund seeking long-term investments that take ac-
count of future climate change risks might favour shifting investments
from fossil fuel industries to some emerging renewable energy technol-
ogy firms. Presently, such investments may seem too remote and spec-
ulative. Under this model, SRI can be sanctioned as a permissiblemethod
where social and environmental factors have a material bearing on
194 See E.S. Shaw, Financial Deepening in Economic Development (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1975); G. Yago, “Financial Repression and the Capital Crunch
Recession: Political and Regulatory Barriers to Growth Economics” in B.S. Zycher
& C. Lewis, eds., Economic Policy, Financial Markets, and Economic Growth
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1993) 81.
195 See Roberts v. Hopwood, [1925] A.C. 578 (U.K. H.L.); Prescott v. Birmingham
Corp., [1955] Ch. 210 (U.K.).
196 Brokerage House Analysts, The Materiality of Social, Environmental and Corporate
Governance Issues to Equity Pricing (Geneva: UNEP Finance Initiative, 2004).
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financial returns in the short or long-term. The materiality threshold test
is allowable now, but policy reform can encourage it.
Some jurisdictions have also legislated to allow SRI as a discre-
tionary concern. In Canada, lawmakers in Manitoba and Ontario have
encroached on traditional formulations of trustees’ fiduciary duties. In
1993, the Manitoba Law Reform Commission recommended that the
province amend its legislation to permit trustees to consider non-finan-
cial criteria in their investment policies.197 In 1995, Manitoba’s Trustee
Act was amended to provide:198
Subject to any express provision in the instrument creating the trust, a trustee who
uses a non-financial criterion to formulate an investment policy or to make an
investment decision does not thereby commit a breach of trust if, in relation to
the investment policy or investment decision, the trustee exercises the judgment
and care that a person of prudence, discretion and intelligence would exercise in
administering the property of others.199
In 2005, a similar provision was introduced into Manitoba’s pension
legislation, thereby allowing non-financial investment considerations.200
Ontario’s reform was more specific and discrete. In 1990, the prov-
ince enacted the South African Trust Investments Act to discourage
Ontarian companies from investing in an apartheid system. The Act
permitted a trustee to divest or reject investments in companies doing
business in South Africa without infringing their duty.201 The Ontario
reform is significant because it sanctioned divestments even though it
could have an adverse effect on investment returns. However, the leg-
islation stipulated that trustees could not take such actions without the
consent of a majority of their beneficiaries.202 Though, like the Mani-
197 Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Ethical Investment by Trustees (Winnipeg:
Manitoba Law Reform Commission, 1993) 32.
198 The Trustee Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. T160, s. 79.1.
199 Other Canadian provinces have not followed the Manitoban precedent. The British
Columbia Law Institute, however, advised its province against adoption of the
Manitoba law change because “application of non-financial criteria must be au-
thorized by the terms of the trust if the trustees are to be excused from liability for
obtaining a lower return than conventional financial investment criteria would
produce”: Trustee Act Modernization Committee, Report on Trustee Investment
Powers (Vancouver: British Columbia Law Institute, April 1999) 19.
200 The Pension Benefits Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. P32, s. 28.1(2.2).
201 South African Trust Investments Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.16, s. 3.
202 Ibid., s. 4.
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toban reform, Ontario’s initiative did not actually mandate SRI – it
remained a discretionary consideration for investors.
In the governmental occupational pension sector, some jurisdic-
tions have also legislated to allow for SRI. Connecticut state law for
instance provides that state pension fund fiduciaries may consider the
environmental and social implications of investments, including deci-
sions related to individual securities or types of securities.203
The Canada Pension Plan (CPP)204 has recently revised its invest-
ment policy to incorporate policies on social and environmental invest-
ment and corporate engagement. The CPP Investment Board’s Policy
on Responsible Investing, issued in October 2005, provides that the
principles to guide its investments include:
• Recognizing that the importance of environmental, social and
governance (ESG) factors varies across industries, geography and
time, responsible corporate behaviour with respect to ESG factors
can generally have a positive influence on long-term corporate
behaviour.
• Investment analysis should incorporate ESG factors to the extent
that they affect long-term risk and return.205
The CPP Investment Board’s “overriding” responsibility remains how-
ever to “maximize investment returns without undue risk”.206 But the
fact that the CPP Investment Board has begun (albeit belatedly) to
recognize the materiality of SRI issues without any amendment to its
legislative charter is significant.
(c) The Disclosure Approach
Another way by which pension funds could become an instrument
of environmental and social change is through legislative requirements
203 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 3-13d(a) (2002).
204 The CPP is a contributory, earnings-related social insurance program, managed by
the federal government. It can provide additional retirement income in addition to
earnings from private pension plans. See further, online: www.sdc.gc.ca/en/isp/
cpp/cpptoc.shtml.
205 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB), Policy on Responsible Investing
(Ottawa: CLLIB, Oct. 2005) 2. The CPP was previously criticized for some socially
irresponsible investments: T. Flynn, “War and Weapons Funded by Canada Pension
Plan” (2004) 30(4) Alt. J. 16.
206 Ibid., at 2.
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for trustees and their agents to publicly report on their policies in this
respect. The reporting process can heighten public expectations that
pension funds should adopt an SRI policy, and can have pedagogic value
to fund trustees themselves.
The UK was the first country to take a tentative step in this direction.
In July 1999, the government issued a regulation under the Pensions Act
1995 requiring occupational pension fund trustees to disclose their pol-
icies, if any, on SRI and on the exercise of shareholder rights, including
voting rights.207 A similar requirement was imposed on local government
pension funds.208
The UK example stimulated similar reforms in several European
countries and Australia.209 Legislation requiring pension funds to dis-
close environmental, social or ethical considerations in their investment
policies was enacted in several EU states including Belgium,210
France,211 and Germany.212 In Australia, legislation adopted in 2001
applied an SRI disclosure obligation on a wider range of investment
products than found in the European examples, covering pensions, retail
mutual funds and investment life insurance products.213 At the time, the
Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia declined to support
it, and in a staff paper it was argued “there were currently no definitions
207 Enacted pursuant to Pensions Act 1995, c. 26, s. 35(3)(f): Occupational Pension
Schemes (Investment, and Assignment, Forfeiture, Bankruptcy etc.), Amendment
Regulations 1999, cl. 2(4). Now contained in the Occupational Pension Schemes
(Investment) Regulations 2005: cl. 2(3)(b)(vi)-(3)(c).
208 Local Government Pension Scheme (Management and Investment of Funds)
(Amendment) Regulations 1999.
209 The Financial Services Reform Act 2001(Cth) introduced a new part 7 into the
Corporations Act, which contains the reform in question. See B.J. Richardson,
“Pensions Law Reform and Environmental Policy: A New Role for Institutional
Investors?” (2002) 3(5) Journal of International Financial Markets: Law and Reg-
ulation 159.
210 Law of April 28, art. 42(3), Moniteur Belge (2d ed.), May 15, 2003, at 26, 407
(Belg.).
211 Projet de loi sur l’e´pargne salariale, 7 Feb. 2001. No.2001-152, art. 2; Projet de loi
portant diverses dispositions d’ordre social, e´ducatif et culturel. 28 June 2001,
Chapitre Vbis, art. L.135-8.
212 Betriebliche Altersvorsorge: art. 10, A¨ nderung des Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetzes.
213 Corporations Act 2001, s. 1013D(1)(l). See further B.J. Richardson, “Ethical In-
vestment and the Commonwealth’s Financial Services Reform Act 2001” (2002) 2
National Environmental Law Review 47.
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for the terms environmental, social or ethical, and therefore the require-
ment was likely to be misused and misleading”.214 None of these disclo-
sure reforms statutorily define what constitutes “socially responsible
investment” or similar concepts, and only Australia provides substantive
guidance from the regulator.215
As to implementation, a 2003 study of the UK reform by the Ethical
Investment Research Service found that 90 percent of UK pension funds
disclosed in their statement of investment principles what they consid-
ered social, environmental and ethical policies.216 Another study in 2004
reported a large increase in ethical investing by UK pension funds,
though it could not observe or claim a causal relationship between this
and the change in law.217 It also suggested however that UK pension
funds were not actively monitoring companies’ compliance with social
and environmental polices.218 In 2004, the Australian Conservation
Foundation (ACF) undertook a study of Australia’s top 25 investment
managers’ compliance with the SRI policy disclosure regulation. The
ACF found that “many mainstream investment managers still do not
appreciate the relationship between ethical corporate behaviour and
long-term financial performance”.219 Further reform may therefore be
214 Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA), Development of ASFA
Policy on “Ethical Investment” (Sydney: ASFA, Oct. 2000) 4.
215 The Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) in 2005 released
binding regulations for issuers of investment product disclosure statements (PDS).
The regulations apply in cases where a PDS claims that labour standards or envi-
ronmental, social or ethical standards have been taken into account in investment
decisions. The guidelines require investment product issuers to provide clients with
sufficient detail regarding the methodology for taking the relevant standards or
considerations into account; any weighting system used with respect to the standards
and considerations; and a description of the product issuer’s retention and realization
policies. The PDS must include a general description of whether adherence to the
methodology will be monitored or reviewed, and an explanation of what will happen
when an investment no longer matches the stated investment policy. ASIC, Disclo-
sure: Product Disclosure Statements (and other disclosure obligations) (Canberra:
ASIC, May 2005).
216 Ethical Investment Research Service (EIRIS), How Responsible is Your Pension?
(London: EIRIS, 2003).
217 D. Wheeler & J. Thomson, Comparative Study of U.K. and Canadian Pension Fund
Transparency Practices (Ottawa: NRTEE, 2004) 18.
218 Ibid., at 20.
219 C. Berger, Disclosure of Ethical Considerations in Investment Product Disclosure
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needed to devise suitable sanctions and remedies should pension fund
managers and trustees fail to invest according to their SRI statements.
In Canada, the Social Investment Organization has been lobbying
for change, and it supported an attempt to pass a private member’s bill
modelled on the UK law. In September 2002, Bloc Quebecois MP
Stephan Tremblay introduced a bill to amend the Pension Benefits Stan-
dards Act, 1985 to require federally regulated pension plans to disclose
their policies, if any, on SRI.220
(d) Compulsory SRI
More forceful legal mechanisms may be more appropriate than
merely allowing SRI where it meets “materiality” thresholds or requiring
disclosure of applicable SRI policies. Each may fail to induce changes
in long-standing investment practices. Policy-makers could insist that
investors take social and environmental impacts into account as part of
their fiduciary investment duties. This is not unprecedented, though rare
given the political obstacles.
The precautionary principle could help shape such a restatement of
fiduciary responsibilities. While many developed nations have sub-
scribed to the precautionary principle in their environmental legisla-
tion,221 they have not sought to operationalize it in the regulation of their
capital markets. Given conditions of scientific uncertainty about the
environmental effects of human development, the precautionary prin-
ciple recommends we take preventative action before risks are conclu-
sively established since delay may prove more costly to society and
nature.222
Prudential investment standards governing fiduciaries could incor-
porate the precautionary principle. Operationalizing the precautionary
Statements: A Review of Current Practice in Australia (Melbourne: ACF, August
2004) 1.
220 Bill C-394, An Act to amend the Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985.
221 E. Hey, “The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Law and Policy: Institu-
tionalising Precaution” (1994) 4 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 303; E. Fisher, et al.
(eds.), Implementing the Precautionary Principle: Perspectives and Prospects
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006).
222 See J. Cameron & J. Abouchar, “The Precautionary Principle” (1991) 14 B.C. Int’l
& Comp. L. Rev. 1; D. Bodansky, “Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary
Principle” (1991) 33 Environment 4.
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principle has proven exceptionally difficult in other policy contexts, and
it would likely be so in the financial sector. A possible starting point
would be to lower the thresholds that would trigger a requirement for
fiduciary investors to respond to environmental risks. Rather than merely
requiring a response where environmental threats seem sufficiently “ma-
terial” to financial risks and returns, fiduciaries should take a longer
term investment horizon, taking environmental hazards into account for
which there may presently be much less certainty.
The precautionary principle is starting to get acknowledgement in
some voluntary corporate codes of conduct,223 but it has yet to appear as
a matter of practice in the financial services sector. The recent emergence
of “weather derivatives” to hedge risk against natural disasters including
climate change induced calamities does however encouragingly suggest
that capital markets are experimenting with mechanisms to accommo-
date new types of environmental risks.224
At this time, few jurisdictions have imposed obligations in discrete
contexts for institutional investors to consider social or environmental
impacts. This has occurred mainly in the US state pension fund sector.
During the 1980s various US states led by Connecticut forbade invest-
ment of state funds in companies doing business in South Africa unless
the corporation adhered to the Sullivan Principles225 and had been rated
a good performer under the Sullivan Principles scoring system.226 Mas-
sachusetts also directed its public pension funds not to invest in banks
or other financial institutions that had outstanding loans to South Af-
223 E.g., UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2
of 26 August 2003, Article 14.
224 C. Dosi & M. Moretto, “Global Warming and Financial Umbrellas” (2003) 4(4)
Journal of Risk Finance 18; R.S. Dischel & P. Barrieu, “Financial WeatherContracts
and their Application in Risk Management” in R.S. Dischel (ed.), Climate Risk and
the Weather Market (London: Risk Books, 2002) at 35.
225 The Sullivan Principles were drafted in 1977 by Leon Sullivan, a pastor and human
rights activist, and posited voluntary labour standards for US companies operating
in South Africa: H.J. Richardson, “Leon Sullivan’s Principles, Race and Interna-
tional Law: A Comment” (2001) 15 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 55.
226 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 3-13f (Supp. 1984); see further G. Jubinsky, “State and Municipal
Governments React Against South African Apartheid: An Assessment of the Con-
stitutionality of the Divestment Campaign” (1985) 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 453.
THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF PENSION FUNDS 195
rica.227 Some city governments also enacted ordinances to give similar
effect to the Sullivan Principles.228 The validity of the US examples from
a fiduciary duty perspective was upheld in the Baltimore (City) case, as
discussed earlier.229 The federal government also got involved pursuant
to the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986,230 which prohibited
new US investment in apartheid South Africa and required American
businesses with more than 25 employees in South Africa to comply with
the Sullivan Principles.231
During this period, some US states also legislated to apply the
MacBride Principles,232 prohibiting state funds from investment in cor-
porations doing business in Northern Ireland that did not promote equal
hiring practices and the security and safety of employees.233 Over 15
states and the federal Congress have enacted MacBride legislation.234
Outside of the US, Swedish, Norwegian, New Zealand and French
national pension schemes have recently been amended by legislation to
direct their funds towards SRI goals.235 French legislation governing the
227 Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 32, § 23(1)(d)(ii) (Supp. 1984).
228 Jubinsky, supra, n. 226.
229 317 Md. 72, 562 A.2d 720 (1989).
230 Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986), codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151, 2346(d),
5001-5116 (Supp. IV 1986).
231 Some US states have tried to legislate certain other restrictions on how state funds
are invested. Texas enacted a law in 1997 which forbids state entities from investing
in any company that owns at least 10% of a business that records or produces certain
kinds of music deemed offensive by the statute (e.g., promotes illegal drug use and
racially-motivated violence): N. Strauss, “Texas Bans Investment in Explicit Re-
cordings” (June 21, 1997) New York Times, section 1 at 13.
232 The MacBride Principles, proposed by Sea´n MacBride, an international human
rights activist, are a US corporate code of conduct drafted in 1984 to combat
pervasive discrimination against Catholics in Northern Ireland: K.A. Bertsch &
H.E. Booth, The MacBride Principles and U.S. Companies in Northern Ireland
(New York: Investor Responsibility Research Centre, 1991).
233 See C. McCrudden, “Human Rights Codes for Transnational Corporations: What
Can the Sullivan and MacBride Principles Tell Us?” (1999) 19(2) Oxford J. Legal
Stud. 167; N.J. Conway, “Investment Responsibility in Northern Ireland: The Mac-
Bride Principles of Fair Employment” (2002) 24 Loyola of Los Angeles Interna-
tional and Comparative Law Review 1.
234 K.A. Burke, “Fair Employment in Northern Ireland: The Role of Affirmative Ac-
tion” (1994) 28 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 1, 12.
235 J. Myles & P. Pierson, “The Comparative Political Economy of Pension Reform”
in P. Pierson (ed.), The New Politics of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001) 305.
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Retirement Reserve Funds (Fonds de Re´serve Pour Les Retraites)
obliges fund managers to consider environmental and social issues in
investment decisions.236 Under the Swedish National Pension Funds Act
of 2000, “environmental and social considerations shall be taken into
account in investment activities without impinging on the overall goal
of a high return on capital”.237 The five national pension funds have
since revised their investment policies to promote SRI.238 New Zealand’s
Superannuation and Retirement Income Act 2001 specifies that a “state-
ment of investment policies, standards, and procedures must cover ...
ethical investment, including policies, standards, or procedures for
avoiding prejudice to New Zealand’s reputation as a responsible member
of the world community”.239 The Guardians of the New Zealand Super-
annuation Fund have been slow to develop their SRI policy, and as of
early 2006 no company or country had been excluded from investment
on ethical grounds.240
Most recently, the Norwegian Government Public Pension Fund241
was established on January 1, 2006 with an SRI mandate. The Fund’s
“Ethical Guidelines”, adopted by government regulation, state that the
Fund: “should not make investments which constitute an unacceptable
risk that the Fund may contribute to unethical acts or omissions, such as
violations of fundamental humanitarian principles, serious violations of
human rights, gross corruption or severe environmental damages”.242
236 The relevant part of the French law provides: ‘Il met en oeuvre les orientations de
la politique de placement. Il controle le respect de celles-ci. Il en rend compte
regulie`rement au conseil de surveillance et retrace notamment, a cet effet, la manie`re
dont les orientations ge´ne´rales de la politique de placement du fonds ont pris en
compte des conside´rations sociales, environnementales et e´thiques’: Loi N 2001-
624 du 17 juillet 2001 portant diverses dispositions d’ordre social, e´ducatif et
culturel. Art. L.135-8.
237 Sweden Government Bill 1999/2000: 46, “The AP Fund in the Reformed Pension
System” (January 13, 2000), s. 7.1.
238 E.g., Trejde AP-fonden, Third Swedish National Pension Fund: Annual Report
2004 (Stockholm: Trejde AP-fonden, 2005) 22 (emphasizing corporate engagement
rather than screening methods of SRI).
239 Section 61(d).
240 Interview, Paul Costello, CEO, Guardians of the New Zealand SuperannuationFund
(December 2005).
241 The Fund incorporated the existing Government Petroleum Fund and the National
Insurance Scheme Fund, which already had some SRI policies.
242 Issued December 22 2005 pursuant to regulation on the Management of the Gov-
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The Ethical Guidelines elaborate that the Fund will apply negative
screening and exercise asset ownership rights as the core methods of
SRI. Unlike the New Zealand Fund’s timid approach to SRI, the Nor-
wegian Fund has already started to exclude problematic businesses, such
as Wal-Mart for its allegedly harsh labour practices.243
As progressive as these investment reforms might seem, we must
recognize that they only target public pension funds. No government
has yet been so bold as to mandate SRI for private pension plans.
(e) Other Incidental Reforms
Getting pension fund trustees to invest responsibly is not just a
matter of blunt regulation. It also requires a policy framework that can
improve how trustees are selected and educated, as well as how they
interact with pension plan beneficiaries. These should be treated as
relevant ancillary components of fiduciary investment responsibilities.
Accordingly, pension fund trustees should be more accountable to
fund membership so that their investment policies are aligned with
beneficiaries. To achieve this, lawmakers should ensure that employees
and retirees have the right to elect a given percentage of trustees.244 They
should be elected at periodic public meetings with full disclosure of
their qualifications and professional experience. Aside from elections,
governments should consider mandating that investment policies be
regularly ratified by fund member votes. Such reforms would help to
give effect to the contractual nature of pension funds.
Pension trustees may lack the necessary expertise about SRI. Many
trustees need training and education in this field. Several SRI think-
tanks now actively promote pension trustee education and training on
SRI issues.245 Public policy should require new forms of trustee training,
ernment Pension Fund (2004), online: http://odin.dep.no/fin/english/topics/
pension fund/p10002777/guidelines/bn.html.
243 B. Baue, “Norwegian Government Pension Fund Dumps Wal-Mart and Freeport
on Ethical Exclusion” Social Funds (June 16 2006), online:
www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi?sfArticleId2034.
244 This occurs to some extent in some jurisdictions, e.g., UK’s Pensions Act 1995, s.
16 (under new amendments employers will no longer be able to opt out of the
member-nominated trustees provisions); and Canada’s Pension Benefits Standards
Act, 1985, s. 7.1.
245 E.g., European Social Investment Forum (EUROSIF), Pension Programme: SRI
198 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [22 B.F.L.R.]
certification, disclosure and ethics, including exposure to current re-
search on the financial significance of SRI. Relevantly, the UK’s Pen-
sions Act was amended in 2004 to require trustees to attain a certain
level of knowledge and understanding of the trust deed and rules, the
law relating to pensions and trusts and the “principles relating to the
funding of occupational pension schemes and investment of assets of
such schemes”.246 Such higher standards should enable trustees to better
undertake the challenge of SRI.
Finally, pension trustees should also be compelled by legislation
to inform and consult with fund beneficiaries and to consider their views.
It should explicitly form part of their fiduciary responsibilities to actively
inform and consult. Presently, absent an express requirement in the trust
document, there is no general common law onus on trustees to take the
initiative to inform, or consult with, the beneficiaries about the admin-
istration of the trust.247 Trustees do however have obligations to respond
to requests by beneficiaries for information.248 Pension legislation is
evolving to impose a duty on employers to actively inform plan mem-
bers. Canadian pension legislation for instance gives plan members the
right to receive certain information at regular intervals and upon re-
quest.249 The European Union’s Occupational Pensions Fund Directive
– applicable to the UK – also introduces high standards for provision of
information to plan members.250
Consultation rights are less commonly provided. The UK is amend-
ing its pension legislation to prescribe new consultation procedures with
plan members where employers propose “significant” changes to com-
pany pension plans.251 Consultation can help inform SRI choices, espe-
Toolkit 2004-05 (Paris: EUROSIF, 2005); C. Higgs & H. Wildsmith, Responsible
Investment Trustee Toolkit (London: JustPensions, 2005).
246 Pensions Act 2004, c. 35, s. 247(4).
247 J.E. Martin, Hanbury and Mandsley: Modern Equity, 16th ed. (London: Sweet and
Maxwell, 2001) at 524.
248 This right was affirmed as long ago as Walker v. Symonds (1818), 3 Swans. 1, 36
E.R. 751 (U.K.) at 58 [Swans.]. See further, for more contemporary jurisprudence,
M. Thomas, “The Disclosure of Trust Documents in Occupational Pension
Schemes” [1997] J. Bus. L. 514.
249 Kaplan, supra, n. 109 at 214-16.
250 Article 11, supra, n. 66.
251 The Occupational and Personal Pension Schemes (Consultation by Employers and
Miscellaneous Amendment) Regulations, 2006/349.
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cially on controversial ethical issues such as investment in gambling or
armaments production. While unanimity among plan members on ethi-
cal and other SRI issues will usually be hard to establish, participants
could at least identify those issues about which a substantial majority of
the plan members feel strongly.
6. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF INVESTORS’
FIDUCIARY DUTIES
This article seeks to clarify the impact of fiduciaries’ investment
duties in the pension fund sector on SRI. Traditionally, those fiduciary
duties are seen as antithetical to SRI, primarily because ethically-moti-
vated investing is stereotyped as sacrificing financial returns. This article
disputes this dichotomy, arguing that SRI is often financially advanta-
geous and can be implemented by various methods that comply with
duties of prudence and loyalty. Depending on how the “best interests”
of beneficiaries are defined, SRI may even allow for some diminution
of financial returns in order to achieve specific ethical or social benefits
mandated by governing trust instruments.
Fiduciary duties of pension funds have evolved over the centuries
to reflect modern investment practices. They are evolving again to reflect
impacts of environmental and social concerns on corporate financial
performance. Today, the financial world is belatedly learning that good
environmental performance can spur better financial performance, and
it is imperative to have that reflected in fiduciary responsibilities. Failure
to consider and act on environmentally and socially related information
is not prudent in the financial sense of the word and should not be treated
as prudent in the legal sense either. Correctly formulated and applied,
investors’ fiduciary duties should aid rather than hinder SRI.
The enunciation of fiduciary duties in major common law jurisdic-
tions hardly poses a serious hindrance to SRI. There is a paucity of case
law and few judicial or regulatory precedents that hamper SRI. Certainly,
some pension plans are actively addressing social and environmental
issues in their investment policies, and so far without adverse legal
consequences.252 In Canada, the Ontario Municipal Employees Retire-
252 For evidence, see Mercer Investment Consulting, Perspectives on Responsible In-
vestment: A Survey of US Pension Plans, Foundations and Endowments, and Other
Long-Term Savings Tools (Toronto: Mercer Investment Consulting, 2006); UK
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ment System (OMERS) is one of a growing cluster of public sector
occupational pension plans that have embraced an SRI policy and pub-
licly report on how they vote on all proxy contests.253 Similarly, the
Ontario Public Services Employees Union’s (OPSEU) Pension Trust is
also emerging as a major campaigner for corporate environmental and
social responsibility.254 In the US, the California Public Employees Re-
tirement System and the New York State Public Employees Retirement
System are among the leaders in responsible fiduciary activism.255
Yet, in many other cases, conservative pension plan trustees and
their fund managers resist change.256 If market forces or voluntary com-
mitments alone prove too tepid to spur change, then governments may
need to make surgical adjustments to pension laws and other regulations
to foster SRI. This article has canvassed various options, ranging from
discrete to highly interventionist mechanisms.
Encouragingly, the recently enacted United Nations (UN) Princi-
ples of Responsible Investment have been enthusiastically endorsed by
Social Investment Forum, “Growth in Institutional SRI”, online: www.uksif.org/
Z/Z/Z/inst/grow/index.shtml; A. Papmehl, “Sustainable Development and Your
Portfolio: Does It Make Sense to Invest in a Company Known for Bad Environ-
mental or Labour Practices? An Increasing Number of Pension Fund Managers
Think Not” (2002) 26(12) Benefits Canada.
253 OMERS, “Statement of Investment Policies and Procedures for the Ontario Munic-
ipal Employees Retirement System” (January 2003), online: www.omers.com/
investments/statementofinvpol.html#social. OMERS, “Proxy VotingGuidelines”
(January 2002), online: www.omers.com/investments/proxyvoting guidelines/
E-intro.htm.
254 OPSEU, “OPSEU Policy Statement with respect to Union Appointed Trustees and
Sponsors for Jointly Trusteed Pension Plans” (OPSEU, n.d.), online:
www.opseu.org/benefit/policystatement.htm.
255 M. Cohen, “Evidence of a New Environmental Ethic: Assessing the Trend Towards
Investor and Consumer Activism” in I. Jones & M. Pollitt (eds.), The Role of
Business Ethics in Economic Performance (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1998)
111 at 117.
256 See World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Generation Lost: Young
Financial Analysts and Environmental, Social and Governance Issues (Geneva:
UNEP Finance Initiative 2004); S. Davis, ‘Responsible Investment and Pension
Funds’, in Mainstreaming Responsible Investment (World Economic Forum, 2005)
41 at 43. Though some research suggests attitudes are changing: C. Gribben & M.
Gitsham, Will UK Pension Funds Become More Responsible? A Survey of Trustees
(London: JustPensions, 2006).
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a number of the world’s largest private and state pension funds.257 The
UN Principles, adopted in March 2006, steer away from distinguishing
between specific types of investments in favour of best practice standards
for environmental assessment, shareholder activism, public reporting
and other accountability measures.258 The preamble to the Principles
proclaims: “As institutional investors, we have a duty to act in the best
long-term interests of our beneficiaries. In this fiduciary role, we believe
that environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) issues can
affect the performance of investment portfolios”.259 Hopefully, there-
fore, the UN Principles will act as a catalyst to purge any remaining
legal uncertainties on the place SRI warrants in the policies of pension
plans and other investors.
Of course, many factors aside from fiduciary duties will have a
crucial bearing on the prospects for SRI. This article has canvassed only
one of those issues. Corporate governance, accountancy rules, the pric-
ing of environmental resources and risks, taxation incentives for SRI,
are just a few of the many other pressing policy issues that need attention
to enable an SRI revolution.260
257 United Nations, Principles for Responsible Investment, online: www.unpri.org.
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259 Ibid.
260 For analysis of some of these other policy challenges, see B.J. Richardson, “Sus-
tainable Finance: Environmental Law and Financial Institutions” in Richardson &
Wood, supra, n. 192 at 309; B.J. Richardson, “Financing Environmental Change:
A New Role for Canadian Environmental Law” (2004) 49(1) McGill L.J. 145; B.J.
Richardson, “Greening the Financial Sector: Legal Reforms in the European Union”
in Yearbook of European Environmental Law, vol. 7 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press) [forthcoming in 2007].
